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LAW AND ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION IN AN
ANTI-CLASSIFICATION AGE
HILA KEREN*
ABSTRACT
Does our legal system permit the economic exploitation of extreme vulnerability? Focus
ing on predatory housing loans a thriving business at the dawn of the twenty first centu
ry this Article argues that the answer in most cases is yes. Under an individualistic neolib
eral paradigm, borrowers are held liable for their contracts, even if they were targeted with
predatory practices. Further, borrowers’ attempts to resort to antidiscrimination law, and
frame their exploitation as “reverse redlining,” have offered no real answer. An important
yet undertheorized explanation for this problem is the impact of the Supreme Court’s anti
classification jurisprudence on lower courts. In an anti classification age, even outside of the
constitutional arena, courts are reluctant to accept race based arguments. As a result, color
blind analysis of predatory lending permits economic exploitation to thrive.
This Article proposes a unique solution to this deadlock: embedding the analysis of in
dividual borrowers in the context of their neighborhood, a move that neither denies nor re
lies on their race. Drawing on a variety of disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and
public health, this Article explains how residing in distressed neighborhoods the most
embattled neighborhoods of our country creates conditions especially fertile for exploita
tion. Based on this interdisciplinary analysis, this Article suggests an alternative legal
framework which would circumvent the anti classification problem. The new framework is
tailored around the idea of individual dignity, which includes the right to freedom from
economic exploitation. To protect such right it is suggested to utilize contract law and par
ticularly the doctrine of unconscionability which is highly apposite for a contextual analy
sis of predatory agreements.
More broadly this Article argues that one of the important lessons to be learned from the
tragic subprime crisis is how urgent it is to find an appropriate legal response to market
exploitation of vulnerable individuals. Notably, the contractual framework suggested in this
Article for predatory housing loans is useful for handling other exploitative loans, such as
pay day loans and auto title loans. Further, the proposed framework is valuable beyond the
contexts of lending and distressed neighborhoods, to address other forms of economic exploi
tation perpetuated by contract. Given persistent weakness in our economy, establishing an
anti exploitation norm in the market seems more important than ever.
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But the existence of an opportunity is not the same thing as the decision to exploit it.
—Richard A. Posner1

INTRODUCTION
Dire financial times present opportunities for economic exploitation. When individuals are struggling, sophisticated market actors
are there to offer “help” by lending money under predatory terms.
Aptly, during the recent crisis lenders targeted vulnerable communities, comprised mainly of minorities, and identified them as ideal borrowers to whom one can sell almost any loan under any terms. For
these lenders, contra Judge Posner, the existence of an opportunity
leads directly to the decision to exploit it. As a result, it is not surprising that victims of predatory lending have failed to satisfy the
harsh terms of their loans.2 Facing a lawsuit with very limited means

1. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 249 (2009).
2. There is no precise definition of the term “predatory lending.” For this Article’s
purposes, predatory lending has two essential characteristics: “(1) a wide range of lender
behavior that is either substantively or procedurally unreasonably abusive, exploitive,
harmful, or unfair; and (2) a pool of borrowers that are particularity vulnerable, targeted,
and exploited precisely because of their vulnerability.” Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial
Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory Lending under a New Theory of
Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 211, 222 (2003). For an example of a judicial
definition which highlights the exploitation of vulnerability at the core of predatory lend
ing, see Associates Home Equity Services, Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001) (“In using the term ‘predatory lending’ [an expert in the case] refer[red] to
lenders who target certain populations for onerous credit terms. The population generally
targeted includes, among others, the elderly, minorities, and residents of neighborhoods
that do not have ready access to mainstream credit. Credit terms not warranted by the
objective facts regarding the creditworthiness of these individuals are imposed upon them
because for various reasons the lenders feel they can take advantage of a borrower.
Typically predatory lenders take advantage of borrowers due to their lack of sophistication
in the lending market, due to their lack of perceived options for the loan based on
discrimination or some other factor, or due to deceptive practices engaged in by the lender
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to carry a legal battle against powerful financial institutions, many
borrowers have turned to courts across the country in search of legal
relief.
Given the now-known fact that many victims of predatory lending
are minorities, many borrowers have argued their loan agreements
should not be reviewed as the product of a normal bargaining process
which culminated in a free choice to contract.3 Instead, they should
be viewed by use of the anti-discrimination paradigm4 to explain that
their contracts are the result of a discriminatory market behavior
known as “reverse redlining.”5 Subsequently, most courts have analyzed borrowers’ arguments within the framework of antidiscrimination laws, particularly under the norms against discrimination in housing. Although reverse redlining was recognized as a
possible cause of action by judicial interpretation of the Fair Housing
Act and other antidiscrimination laws, courts have refrained from
awarding relief based on this claim.6 And so, almost without exception, borrowers who have fallen prey to predatory lending are losing
the battle against their exploiters.
Leo White was one of those borrowers. When White set out to buy
his very first home he was a twenty-one-year-old African-American,
who had not graduated from high school and who was working as a
hotel bellman earning roughly $2,100 per month.7 The lenders led

that mislead or fail to inform the borrower of the real terms and conditions of the loan.”
(second, third, and fourth emphases added)).
3. By and large, these claims have been made in the context of sizable housing loans
and lending terms that have led to foreclosure. Other predatory loans, such as pay day
loans, are frequently too small to justify the significant cost of litigation, especially due to
the lack of applicable antidiscrimination laws. However, the alternative legal solution
proposed in this Article can apply to all kinds of predatory loans. See infra CONCLUSION
AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS.
4. I use the word “paradigm” with awareness of Professor Richard Delgado’s
observation that something is called “paradigm” only after it has been recognized as
causing systematic injustice that calls for a change and usually after the commentator has
an alternative in mind. See Richard Delgado, Centennial Reflections on the California Law
Review’s Scholarship on Race: The Structure of Civil Rights Thought, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
431, 456 57 (2012). Both aspects of this observation fit the arguments made in this Article.
5. The term “reverse redlining” is rooted in the dark days of actual redlining: banks
would mark maps with red lines to exclude entire minority neighborhoods from the
housing loan market. Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the
Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 179 (2009) (explaining the origins of the term). In its
reversed form, the term refers to a newer method of mistreatment where residents of the
formerly redlined areas are being enticed by lenders to receive egregious housing loans. Id.
The legal theory, or cause of action, of reverse redlining takes its name from this market
behavior. Id.
6. See infra Part I.
7. M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d 538, 546 (2010).
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him to believe that he would be able to repay his loan;8 however their
estimation was unrealistic given his income and the property’s poor
condition, which prevented him from renting out parts of it.9 When
White defaulted, the lenders initiated foreclosure proceedings.10 Defending against foreclosure, White did not deny signing a loan
agreement.11 Rather, he argued that he was preyed upon as part of a
larger scheme of reverse redlining in his Brooklyn neighborhood,
which had been described as “a ‘hot zone’ for predatory lending
schemes.”12 This lawsuit began in 2003 when the scope and magnitude of predatory lending, and its contribution to the larger subprime
mortgage crisis, were still unclear. Years later, in 2010, after so much
more was already known about the patterns of predatory lending,13
the court still doubted that White would be able to prove his arguments regarding mass targeting and race-based discrimination in
lending:
A jury might well conclude that [the borrowers] were targeted not
on the basis of being African-Americans, but because they were
vulnerable, low-income, unsophisticated, first-time home buyers
who happened to be African-American. It is unfortunate that buyers fitting that profile may be found in proportionally greater
numbers in the African-American community, but that observation
does not mean that the [borrowers] were targeted because of their
race.14

Subsequently, the courts’ refusal to credit vulnerable and exploited borrowers’ antidiscrimination claims has acute ramifications that
can only be recognized by piecing public and private law together.
These ramifications originate, I argue, from the lack of an “antiexploitation” legal norm—a fact evidenced by the idea that exploiting
Leo White not as African-American, but “merely” as a vulnerable
low-income borrower is not sufficient to justify relief. First, such judicial response not only reinforces, but exacerbates the growth of economic inequalities between the powerful and the powerless. Second,
it permits and even incentivizes future exploitative market behavior
8. Id. at 544 46.
9. Id. at 546 47.
10. Id. at 547.
11. See id. at 546.
12. M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, No. 04 CV 4775 (NGG)(VVP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1903, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2006).
13. Ironically, by 2010, most of what is known today regarding these lenders’ patterns
of targeting vulnerable communities had already been documented by mainstream news.
See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, Study Finds Disparities in Mortgages by Race, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/nyregion/15subprime.html?pagewant
ed=print& r=1&.
14. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
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by rewarding those who take advantage of others’ vulnerabilities.
Combined, these consequences create an environment that facilitates
the perpetuation and growth of economic exploitation. This Article
uncovers the roots of the problem and, with those roots in mind, argues for an alternative legal framing that would allow courts to respond more effectively to contract-based economic exploitation.
The repeated failure of reverse redlining arguments can be explained, at least in part, by the devastating constraints placed on the
litigating borrowers. As other scholars have pointed out, the leading
reasons are that the borrowers lack the minimal financial means
necessary to endure prolonged litigation and are faced with grave
problems of information asymmetry.15 Nonetheless, this Article argues that there is another, unacknowledged reason for the disappointing results of reverse redlining litigation. This important explanation does not relate to the borrowers, but to the antidiscrimination
doctrine courts use to resolve their cases.
Notably, group-based or identity-based arguments are increasingly met with judicial opposition. The resistance seems to start at the
top—the Supreme Court has expressed increasing reluctance to engage in group-based classifications. Most recently, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin16 reconfirmed an “anti-classification” judicial approach: an interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause17 as barring governmental use of classifications, including even benign classifications.18 This view makes it
harder to characterize claimants as members of groups. Scholars
writing in the context of equal protection jurisprudence have described and evaluated this resistance in various ways, using a variety
of names to fit their own perspective, such as “color blindness,”19 “anticlassification,”20 “anti-antidiscrimination,”21 “antibalkanization,”22
15. See, e.g., Andrew Lichtenstein, United We Stand, Disparate We Fall: Putting
Individual Victims of Reverse Redlining in Touch with Their Class, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1339, 1339 (2010); Charles Falck, Note, Equitable Access: Examining Information
Asymmetry in Reverse Redlining Claims Through Critical Race Theory, 18 TEX. J. C.L. &
C.R. 101, 114 18 (2012).
16. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
18. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
19. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness”
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 84 (2000).
20. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 9, 10 (2003).
21. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142
(2002).
22. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground
of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011).
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“the new equal protection,”23 and “post-racialism.”24 Despite the range
of approaches, a common theme has emerged: the Supreme Court’s
willingness to accept group-based arguments is decreasing. Ours is
becoming an anti-classification age, where classifications are increasingly considered “repugnant.”25
By and large, commentators’ attention to this phenomenon has
been reserved for high profile constitutional battles that are covered
extensively by the media, like the refusal to acknowledge sexual orientation as a protected classification in Lawrence v. Texas.26 Yet this
Article identifies and analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court’s reluctance to engage in group-based classifications on lower courts’ decision-making, namely with respect to both private law issues and
economic transactions, particularly in the context of housing loans.
Although, originally, the anti-classification approach is a reading of
the Equal Protection Clause with regard to state actors, there is a
“spillover” of anti-classification sentiments. This process shapes judicial thinking and operates to restrict both lower courts’ willingness to
charge private actors with discrimination and their readiness to
award, as arms of the state, race-conscious remedies based on groupbased arguments.27
Further, recognizing such “spillover” illuminates how—hidden
from the public eye—the tendency towards anti-classification has
contributed to the repeated failures of the subprime crisis victims in
court. As a result, borrowers are forced to pay the price for what society prefers to frame, not as a social problem, but rather as the borrower’s private choice to agree to a bad contract.
Some scholars have insisted on the crucial role of race in the predatory lending story and engaged in group-based efforts to propose
reforms.28 Unfortunately, the anti-classification frame courts employ
23. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 792 93 (2011).
24. Sumi Cho, Post Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1603 (2009) (“[P]ost racialism
idealizes a society in which race is no longer a basis for differential treatment, grievance, or
remedy.” (emphasis added)); see also William M. Carter, Jr., The Paradox of Political Power:
Post Racialism, Equal Protection, and Democracy, 61 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1125 26 (2012).
25. Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional
Antidiscrimination Law in the United States and South Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1378,
1383 (2004).
26. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
27. See Adam Weiss, Note, Grutter, Community, and Democracy: The Case for Race
Conscious Remedies in Residential Segregation Suits, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1195, 1197
(2007) (discussing the fact that changes in the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence have made lower courts “hesitant to use race” in the context of awarding
race conscious remedies by ordering state actors to promote housing desegregation).
28. See, e.g., Charles L. Nier, III & Maureen R. St. Cyr, A Racial Financial Crisis:
Rethinking the Theory of Reverse Redlining to Combat Predatory Lending Under the Fair
Housing Act, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 941, 946 47 (2011).
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seems to render this trajectory idle. Therefore, it may be a more
pragmatic strategy for borrowers, who are locked in predatory
agreements, to carve a different path: bringing courts the question of
exploitation while relying less on racial classifications.
To distinguish between inequality and discrimination would be a
useful first step in this alternative direction. The sad fact that some
people take advantage of their unequal counterparts does not always
fit conventional models of discrimination, which assume some level of
animus. Put simply, it is possible that the lenders who dealt with Leo
White were exploiting his evident vulnerabilities—which are surely
connected to his race—without having a particularly negative attitude towards African-Americans in general. To be sure, this reasoning should not legitimize the lenders’ behavior, but it may explain
why a court that avoids seeing discrimination would not award relief
that is based on antidiscrimination laws. For that reason, to focus on
the shared vulnerabilities of the exploited borrowers, and the ways in
which these vulnerabilities were identified and preyed upon, has
more potential than relying on racial identities, at least in an anticlassification age.
Indeed, the vulnerabilities shared by borrowers who signed predatory loan agreements stem from physically residing in the formerlyredlined neighborhoods. These neighborhoods are, for the most part,
our country’s worst neighborhoods. Living in such “distressed neighborhoods,” as referred by sociologists and other non-legal scholars,29
has dire effects that occupy space that is both public and private. As
studies in the fields of health, psychology, and sociology uniformly
show, life in a distressed neighborhood often results in some degree
of chronic stress. Further, the outcomes of chronic stress
are noticeable and include interference with complex decisionmaking processes. Thus, these outcomes attract lenders’ deliberate
efforts to confuse borrowers and exploit them.30 Although such outcomes are taking their toll on individuals, their causes are tightly
linked to state policies.31 Accordingly, to focus on neighborhoods’ effects on its residents offers a new understanding of the problem of
predatory lending. Importantly, it challenges the tendency to frame
the agreement using predatory terms as an autonomous choice under
a free market paradigm. That the majority of residents in distressed

29. See infra Part II.
30. See generally Hila Keren, Consenting Under Stress, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (2013).
31. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Comment, Colorblind Segregation: Equal
Protection as a Bar to Neighborhood Integration, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 848 50 (2004)
(discussing, among other policies, the situating of public housing projects only in minority
neighborhoods).
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neighborhoods are minorities is an unquestionable reality.32 Nonetheless, a neighborhood-based analysis explains the implications of such
reality in terms that take the impact of race into account without relying on it as a necessary factor. Thus, for example, a white older female borrower who has lived in the distressed neighborhood all her
life may as well be an easy target for greedy lenders. And so, rather
than viewing borrowers merely as market players making free choices, or casting them off as members of subordinated groups, a third
path exists. This neighborhood-based path still views borrowers as
autonomous individuals, but simultaneously acknowledges their
shared vulnerabilities. To focus on the borrowers’ neighborhood context would help courts understand that the individual exploitation of
each borrower can be properly recognized and remedied, if linked to
its social roots and its public, state-produced causes.
The innovative vulnerability theory33 supports the proposal to find
a way to award protection to borrowers without relying on classification. What is required is a space between inappropriate individualist
colorblindness and unpopular group-based measures. Contract law,
as the body of law that directly applies to predatory agreements, can
offer exactly that third possibility. In appropriate cases—where it is
evident that vulnerability was preyed upon—courts would exercise
their discretion, under the existing contractual doctrine of unconscionability, to invalidate exploitative contracts in general, and predatory loan agreements in particular. Unconscionability is designed to
give courts the power to invalidate unfair contracts that result from
an absence of meaningful choice of one party combined with sharp
methods of the other. As such, unconscionability can be used to review predatory loan agreements and establish a clearer norm against
32. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE
ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012) (exploring the structural reasons for the poor
conditions in the country’s worst neighborhoods, while taking race into account and linking
neighborhood effects to the virtual absence of low income white communities not only in
Chicago but nationwide).
33. The vulnerability theory suggests replacing the autonomous subject with the
vulnerable subject as the focus of any legal or political project. Insisting that all human
beings are vulnerable, in different ways, the theory also emphasizes the role of the state,
and the legal system it holds to, in creating, maintaining, and intensifying vulnerabilities.
This role, often concealed under the neoliberal approach, justifies, even requires,
interventions by the state on behalf of the vulnerable subject. The vulnerability theory has
been developed by Professor Martha Fineman. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 256 57 (2010) (introducing the
vulnerability theory and arguing for a "vulnerability approach" that requires the state to
assume a positive obligation to effectuate equality among its citizens) [hereinafter
Fineman, The Responsive State]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject:
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 10 14 (2008)
(presenting the concepts of the "vulnerable subject" and the "responsive state" as important
to America’s approach to inequality) [hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject].
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economic exploitation, thereby filling the void created by reverse redlining cases. Moreover, unconscionability is uniquely structured
around a balancing test that allows careful and contextual legal
analysis of multiple factors without committing to an overarching
classification. Therefore, although possible objections exist (and are
discussed),34 contract law and its unconscionability principle offer a
much-needed legal response to economic exploitation, especially in
times where other reliefs are becoming improbable due to anticlassification sentiments.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the systemic
failure of predatory lending victims in courts as the result of borrowers being trapped between the rock of neoliberalism and the hardplace of colorblindness. Under a neoliberal approach, borrowers are
framed as individuals and therefore held liable for the contracts they
have signed, even if they are undeniably unfair. Under a colorblind
jurisprudence, borrowers’ arguments, which are based on racialidentity, are routinely rejected. Consequently, colorblind analysis of
predatory lending permits economic exploitation to thrive. Part II
contends that a solution to this deadlock exists in defining the space
between the neoliberal and the colorblind analyses: much can be
gained by embedding individual borrowers in the context of their environment, by neither ignoring nor solely relying on their race. In the
same vein, it is possible to comprehend predatory loan agreements,
with their tie to previously redlined areas, as the result of exploiting
the special vulnerability that stems from residing in distressed
neighborhoods. This Part explains how residing in a distressed
neighborhood creates conditions especially fertile for exploitation efforts. Part III argues for an alternative legal framework, which would
circumvent the anti-classification problem described in Part I while
utilizing the interdisciplinary analysis offered in Part II. This
framework is based on an existing contractual cause of action—the
doctrine of unconscionability—which is highly apposite for the contextual analysis of predatory agreements. The proposal is made with
the hope that courts will be more amenable to borrowers’ contractbased arguments than they have been to their color-based arguments.
In conclusion, this Article asserts that this framework can apply
to other urgent contexts of economic exploitation. Among these, nonhousing loans that target residents of distressed neighborhoods—
such as the increasingly popular but tremendously risky auto-title
loans and pay-day loans—are of special significance. In times of prolonged economic crisis, such applications are important and aid us in

34. See infra Part III.
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thinking more generally about how the law could and should respond
to the exploitation of growing inequalities.
I. PREDATORY LENDING AND THE IDENTITY TRAP
A. Reverse Redlining as a Cause of Action
Each borrower who signs a predatory loan agreement has different individual circumstances that might explain her or his decision.
However, with time we have learned that it was not only, and perhaps not mainly, about the borrowers’ personal situations. Something
larger was happening. We now know that many people were preyed
upon, not as individuals, but rather as members of vulnerable communities who belong to certain social groups and reside in poorer and
less popular neighborhoods. African-Americans and Latinos were affected more than any other group, but the elderly and the poor35 have
also suffered. Sophisticated and powerful actors, such as banks and
other creditors, have used the market, specifically the institutionalized instrument of contracts,36 to take advantage of borrowers with
limited bargaining power who attempted to participate in the housing market. For a long time, and especially during the years preceding the recent economic crisis, these sophisticated lenders had done
so in an intentional and calculated manner. Their faulty practices are
now exposed: “[t]he more segregated that a community of color is, the
more likely it is that homeowners . . . will face foreclosure because
the lenders who peddled the most toxic loans targeted those communities.”37 At present, it is recognized that lenders are focused on minorities in certain areas and engaged in “reverse redlining”—a phrase
that importantly connects past forms of discrimination by refusing
mortgage lending (“redlining”) with the more recent sale of unfair
loans to these same populations (“reverse-redlining”).38 Critically, the
35. Hunt, II, supra note 2, at 213 (“The recent explosive growth in the predatory
subprime market has ‘created a crisis of epidemic proportions for communities of color,
elderly homeowners, and low income neighborhoods . . . .’ ”).
36. I use the term “institutionalized,” because the existence of a flourishing system of
contracts relies heavily on legal institutions such as courts, arbitrations enforced by courts,
confirmations of public notaries, and so on.
37. Protecting the American Dream (Part II): Combating Predatory Lending Under the
Fair Housing Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2010) (statement of Thomas E.
Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice) (emphasis
added).
38. See, e.g., Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 21 (D.D.C.
2000) (describing past “redlining” and more current “reverse redlining” as connected evils).
Unfortunately, some courts have stripped the term from its association with a
discriminatory past. See, e.g., Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., No. 08 13476, 308 F. App’x
364, 368 (11th Cir. 2009) (adopting only part of the abovementioned footnote in Hargraves,
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same neighborhoods that were once sites of exclusion under redlining
policies had turned into sites of exploitation under reverse redlining
policies.
This modernized form of redlining has included targeting vulnerable communities in “credit-starved neighborhoods”39 and actively
steering them “to pay more for their loans than they should or to receive loans that they cannot afford.”40 To illustrate, in one case, lenders exerted immense pressure on a borrower who was an immigrant
from Barbados working as a custodian at a day-care center.41 When
the borrower expressed concerns about his ability to repay the loan,
the lenders kept reassuring him and his wife that they could afford to
repay the loan with income from tenants that the lenders promised to
help them secure. During the closing the borrower grew so stressed
that he “suffered a heart attack . . . and was taken to the hospital.”42
Consequently, the borrower was then unemployed, but the lenders
were not deterred and relentlessly contacted the borrower and his
wife until they eventually managed to seal the deal.43 This exemplifies the predatory nature of the deal, which subsequently ended in
foreclosure. The fact that these agreements were and still are referred to as “ghetto loans” further demonstrates the social dimension
of this seemingly contractual phenomenon.44
Moreover, although the lenders—banks, credit companies, and
loan officers—are all “private” players acting within the bounded morality of a market economy, they were permitted and were perhaps
even encouraged by public leaders to engage in lending to minorities.
In an effort to include more minorities in the “American dream,” the
and defining “ ‘reverse redlining’ as ‘the practice of extending credit on unfair terms’
because of the plaintiff's race and geographic area.” (internal citation omitted)). It is im
portant to note that the historical “redlining” practice had its roots in governmental and
not only private discrimination. For example, in 1933 Congress created the Home Owners
Loan Corporation (HOLC). Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2195 (2007). In about two years HOLC refinanced over a million
loans. Id. at n.46 (citation omitted). However, it “used racist underwriting and appraisal
practices, such as rating minority neighborhoods much more unfavorably than white
neighborhoods,” setting a discriminatory legacy that outlived HOLC. Id. (citation omitted).
39. Jesus Hernandez, Redlining Revisited: Mortgage Lending Patterns in Sacramento
1930 2004, 33 INT’L J. URBAN & REG’L RES. 291, 292 (2009).
40. City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09 2857 STA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48522, at *22 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011) (quotations omitted). For a particularly shocking collec
tion of six different predatory loan agreements that resulted from such methods, see Barkley v.
Olympia Mortg. Co., Nos. 04 CV 875(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 187(RJD)(KAM), 05 (CV)
4386(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5302(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5362(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5679(RJD)(KAM),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61940 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007).
41. This is the story of the Mr. and Mrs. Gibbons as told in Barkley. Id. at 19 22.
42. Id. at 21.
43. Id.
44. City of Memphis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522, at *7.
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President and government were greatly involved in a public push to
increase private homeownership in minorities.45 In June 2002, for
example, President Bush issued America’s Homeownership Challenge
to the real estate and mortgage finance industries to encourage them
to join the effort to close the gap between the homeownership rates of
minorities and non-minorities.46 Some commentators have even
blamed the government for triggering the subprime crisis, arguing
that according to this pro-homeownership policy “banks were forced
to lend to unqualified minorities.”47
Where, when, and how to purchase a home, and how and from
whom to borrow money to finance such a significant purchase, is traditionally regarded as an individual’s choice. This is a common misperception, and there is no doubt that the state has always been involved. By a series of interventions and, more importantly, by adopting strong patterns of non-intervention and de-regulation, the state
first facilitated the segregation of the housing market.48 It then facilitated the exploitation of the subsequently segregated populations, by
supporting “the booming subprime industry.”49 The growing governmental hyper-devotion to free market ideology created a “mortgage45. See ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US 3 26 (2009).
46. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: America’s Ownership Socie
ty: Expanding Opportunities (Aug. 9, 2004), available at http://georgewbush white
house.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809 9.html.
47. Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized
Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 902 (2011).
48. See THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY
IN POSTWAR DETROIT 9 10, 34 (4th ed. 1996) (describing how “government housing
programs perpetuated racial divisions by placing public housing in already poor areas and
bankrolling white suburbanization through discriminatory housing subsidies,” and adding
that “[b]ankers seldom lent to black home buyers, abetted by federal housing appraisal
practices that ruled black neighborhoods to be dangerous risks for mortgage subsidies and
home loans”); Thomas J. Sugrue, The New American Dream: Renting, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14,
2009, 11:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702044099045743504326
77038184.html (“Federal housing policies changed the whole landscape of America,
creating the sprawlscapes that we now call home, and in the process, gutting inner cit
ies . . . . It seemed that segregation was just the natural working of the free market, the
result of the sum of countless individual choices about where to live. But the houses were
single and their residents white because of the invisible hand of government.”); see
generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY 89 90 (2005)
(arguing that markets are socially constructed and that the housing market is entirely
constructed by the state).
49. Daniel Immergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy, Market Development,
and the Mortgage Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 484 (2008). For a detailed review of
the influence of the state on the private market of mortgages with a focus on the state’s
involvement in the subprime crisis, see id. See also Benjamin Howell, Comment, Exploiting
Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 101, 103 04 (2006) (“Subprime lending is geographically concentrated in the same
minority neighborhoods once denied access to banks and excluded from federal
homeownership programs because of their racial composition.”).
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loan system that minimized accountability and sought only bodies to
sign loan documents.”50
This free-market position has entrapped vulnerable communities:
on the one hand, members of such communities have been pushed
into the market and pressured to own a home, but on the other hand,
while participating in the market they have been left without regulatory supervision, subject to the mercy of greedy private lenders.51 Leo
White, for instance, argued in court that the lenders employed “African-American agents such as John and Styles, who appealed to potential purchasers that their job was a ‘personal mission’ to help minorities achieve the American Dream of home ownership.”52 The resulting American nightmare—branded by images of gutted neighborhoods, boarded-up windows, foreclosure signs, and entire families
living in their cars or on the streets—is the disastrous outcome attributed to these market practices. The victims have been crowding
the courts seeking legal help,53 while the lenders insist on the enforcement of the original (and predatory) loan agreements. The legal
question now becomes whether or not the exploited borrowers deserve relief.
Disappointingly, the study of post-crisis decisions shows that borrowers frequently lose. They get caught between a rock and a hard
place: between a “private” contractual analysis that ignores the background of reverse redlining, on the one hand, and a “public” analysis
50. McFarlane, supra note 47, at 888; see also Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans:
The Value of a Mass Torts Approach in Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,
3 4 (2009) (“The seeds of the present financial crisis were sown in the 1980s and 1990s,
mostly through deregulation and non regulation.”); Immergluck, supra note 49, at 486 (“In
the arena of financial services regulation, the shift over the last thirty years toward in
creasingly deregulationist policies has been at least as political as any other phase in U.S.
history.”).
51. See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xi xii (2011) (providing an official report made
under the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, documenting the lack of effective regulato
ry oversight to protect borrowers from exploitative lending practices as one of the leading
reasons for the crisis and reporting that “subprime lenders often preyed on the elderly,
minorities, and borrowers with lower incomes and less education”).
52. M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d 538, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Compare
this perspective to the words of President George W. Bush: “I believe when somebody owns
their own home, they’re realizing the American Dream.” President George W. Bush, Ad
dress to HUD Employees on National Homeownership Month (June 18, 2002), available at
http://archives.hud.gov/remarks/martinez/speeches/presremarks.cfm.
53. Raymond H. Brescia, Beyond Balls and Strikes: Towards a Problem Solving Ethic
in Foreclosure Proceedings, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 305, 305 (2009) (“Courts across the
country are being saddled with a rapid escalation of foreclosure filings due to the fallout
from the subprime mortgage crisis. Millions of homeowners stand to lose their homes in the
United States . . . and hundreds of billions of dollars in home equity will be lost as a result
by all homeowners, not just those in default on their mortgages.”).
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of discrimination that tends to fail, on the other hand. It is easy to
see why borrowers lose under the “private” paradigm of market
transactions. From this individualistic perspective, they are perceived as having to pay the price for freely, albeit foolishly, choosing
to consent to a “bad” loan agreement. It is less clear, however, why
borrowers are systematically losing under the “public” view that
takes the phenomenon of “reverse redlining” into account. It is the
failure of this “public” framework that concerns me in this Article.
Ever since the district court’s decision in Hargraves in 2000,
courts recognize a cause of action for “reverse redlining” as a possible
ground for relief to borrowers.54 This cause of action is legally founded mainly under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) or the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA), but also under other federal and local antidiscrimination laws.55 However, this discrimination-based cause of
action seldom translates to borrowers’ success. In a long line of decisions following Hargraves, although as of now without general confirmation of circuit courts,56 courts have applied a four-element test—
sometimes referred to as the Hargraves test—that borrowers seeking
relief under a “reverse redlining” cause of action need to satisfy.57
54. Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2000).
55. The FHA forbids, inter alia, “discriminat[ing] against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). It also makes it unlawful for “any person or other
entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate related transactions to
discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or
conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin.” Id. § 3605. Similarly, the ECOA makes it unlawful for a creditor
to discriminate against a loan applicant on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin,
religion, marital status, or age. 15 U.S.C. § 1691. Some borrowers have also argued under
the broader antidiscrimination sections of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982.
See, e.g., Grimes v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 269, 295 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Oth
ers have also relied on state and local antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Barkley v. Olym
pia Mortg. Co., Nos. 04 CV 875(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 187(RJD)(KAM), 05 (CV)
4386(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5302(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5362(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV
5679)RJD)(KAM), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61940, at *56 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing New
York’s anti discrimination laws). Note that such anti discrimination claims “may be prose
cuted on the basis of (i) disparate treatment, i.e., that plaintiffs were treated differently
because of their membership in a protected class, or on the basis of (ii) disparate impact,
i.e., that the defendant’s practices have a proportionally greater negative impact on minori
ty populations.” White, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (emphases added).
56. Almost none of the circuits have adjudicated a case to determine what the ele
ments of a reverse redlining cause of action should be or what the evidentiary require
ments of those elements are. However, the eleventh circuit did hear a case involving a re
verse redlining cause of action in Steed v. EverHome Mortgage Co., 308 F. App’x 364, 368
(11th Cir. 2009) and later in Steed v. Everhome Mortgage Co., 477 Fed. App’x 722 (11th Cir.
2012). In both decisions the court followed the Hargraves elements and held that Steed did
not establish prima facie case of reverse redlining mainly due to failing to bring satisfying
evidence of discrimination.
57. Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 28, at 942 43.
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First, borrowers must prove they are members of a protected class.
Second, borrowers need to prove that they applied for and were qualified for a housing loan. Third, borrowers must show that their loan
agreement includes grossly unfavorable terms. And fourth, borrowers
must prove that the lender(s) they were dealing with intentionally
discriminated against them or intentionally targeted them. In addition to those four substantive elements there is a time limitation:
borrowers should act fast as they only have two years to take action.
Sadly, time and time again borrowers fail in their efforts to establish “reverse redlining” as grounds for relief. For the most part, individual borrowers fail to satisfy the fourth element, and do not succeed in proving that the lender had utilized discriminatory policies.
In Grimes, for example, an African-American couple borrowed money
under a loan agreement that exhibited characteristics typical of “reverse-redlining”—as shown by the post-crisis literature—such as
tempting initial payments followed by significantly higher payments
and a rapidly growing (“adjusted”) interest.58 Arguing pro-se, the
couple explicitly alleged that their contract should not be analyzed in
isolation but rather viewed as part of a larger lending method that
“targeted minority homeowner borrowers with bogus financing terms
and grossly unfair lending products . . . .”59 The court, however,
granted the lenders’ motions to dismiss, stating, inter alia, that the
borrowers failed to prove the concrete discrimination against them.60
Other courts, cited in Grimes, have rejected cases on similar grounds
of failure to prove specific acts of discrimination, and have clarified

58. See Grimes, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 280; see generally Oren Bar Gill, The Law,
Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073
(2009) (explaining how the main features of subprime mortgage contracts were designed to
prey on borrowers’ imperfect rationalities and to attract them to agree to problematic
contracts). Similar to the Grimes’ contract, those features included “two or three year
‘teaser’ rates followed by substantial increases in the rate and payment” and complex
calculation of an adjusted interest. Id. at 1098. As Bar Gill maintains, minorities, women,
and individuals from lower socio economic background were especially prone to paying the
price of imperfect rationality and were particularly susceptible to the misleading aspects of
those types of contracts. Id. at 1138 39.
59. Grimes, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 280.
60. Id. at 296 (“Plaintiffs do not specifically allege that Defendants took these
purportedly discriminatory actions, or intended to take these actions, because Plaintiffs
were African American. Nor do Plaintiffs provide any facts in support of their contention
that intentional discrimination occurred.”); see also Rodriguez v. Bear Stearns Cos., No. 07
cv 1816 (JCH), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119942, at *55 (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2009) (rejecting
similar allegations made by one Hispanic and four African American borrowers, stating
“[b]ecause plaintiffs have failed to offer any evidence to support the allegation that EMC’s
policies disproportionately impact minorities, plaintiffs have failed to ‘present such
evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor,’ and summary judgment for the
defendants is appropriate as to the FHA disparate impact claim.” (citation omitted)).
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that merely arguing that particular lenders were involved in reverse
redlining will not suffice.61
Given the mounting evidence of lenders’ predatory policies, which
especially targeted previously redlined areas, the question is: why
are borrowers failing to prove what is generally known to all? Scholars so far have pointed out several leading reasons for such systematic failure.62 First, many borrowers cannot afford legal representation
and fail in court simply because they try to argue pro-se and lose due
to their inability to satisfy procedural requirements, such as suing in
a timely manner.63 Even those who manage to find a lawyer usually
get one lacking the expertise required to handle complex civil rights
litigation. Second, many borrowers are lacking crucial information
and misunderstand the general phenomenon of “reverse redlining.”
Further, they are too isolated and lack access to people who have a
better understanding of the complex techniques used by sophisticated
lenders. Third, the borrowers’ task is almost a mission impossible
due to extreme information asymmetries. Namely, how can a poor
and uneducated individual-borrower successfully reveal, and then
prove, that a sophisticated credit company utilized predatory marketing schemes? This difficulty is compounded by the efforts often made
by credit companies to conceal any information regarding unsound
methods.64 Fourth, even if revealed, economic information is complex
and borrowers generally cannot succeed where many experts have
failed—in proving that economic data shows intentional discrimination or even intentional targeting. Fifth, borrowers are routinely
failed by heightened pleading standards, which impose on them an

61. Grimes, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 292 n.33 (“Plaintiffs’ allegations of disparate treatment
are also very generalized, as they fail to plead that any specific similarly situated non
African American applicant received a better loan.”); see also Ng v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., No.
07 CV 5434 (RRM) (VVP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125711, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009)
(dismissing reverse redlining claim because the facts were “alleged in far too conclusory a
fashion to satisfy the current pleading requirements” of Iqbal and Twombly and “the
claims [we]re alleged with little more than buzzwords and conclusory labels, in the absence
of the requisite factual allegations[] . . . .”); Williams v. 2000 Homes Inc., No. 09 CV 16 (JG)
(JMA), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65433, at *13 17 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (allegations that
the plaintiff was induced to sign less favorable loans than those given to Caucasians, and
that the defendants targeted him as part of this scheme based on his race and engaged in a
practice that had a disparate impact to the detriment of non white buyers, were too
conclusory to state a plausible FHA claim under Iqbal).
62. Lichtenstein, supra note 15, 1373 74.
63. See, e.g., Grimes, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 290 (rejecting reverse redlining arguments
made under the FHA and ECOA, because “the limitations period for this claim expired on
October 12, 2007, approximately three and a half months before Plaintiffs filed this
action”). The Grimes court also cited various other similar cases. Id. at 290 91.
64. Falck, supra note 15 (describing the problem of information asymmetry, arguing
that it is the main reason for borrowers’ failure in litigating reverse redlining cases and
suggesting a legal reform).
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additional and heavy burden, such as a need to allege with enough
particularity “that [lenders] selected [borrowers] for maltreatment
solely because of their color.”65 For instance, in one case the court
held that four affidavits from different African-American borrowers,
who had fallen prey to the same lender, were insufficient.66 Finally,
the few borrowers who actually managed to overcome such obstacles
and survive the early dismissal of their relief request, still failed to
convince the lay people of the jury that reverse redlining took place.
Even when jurors were convinced that a conspiracy to defraud vulnerable African-American borrowers indeed existed, they were still
reluctant to see such conspiracy as discrimination.67
In short, while it is simple to prove both the borrowers’ vulnerability and the predatory nature of the loan agreements, the borrowers’
loss in court, for the most part, may be attributed to the discrimination argument. This severe problem, called here “the identity trap,”
means that borrowers cannot convince the court or a jury that it is
necessarily their racial identity—and not other sources of vulnerability—that motivated and brought about the resulting unfair agreement. Based on this reasoning, the court doubted Leo White’s ability
to prevail when he tried to raise the reverse redlining argument.68
Although the court acknowledged the predatory nature of the transaction, as well as White’s racial identity and the fact that ninety percent of the lender’s transactions were made with borrowers “in heavi65. Grimes, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 296 n.39 (clarifying that “after Twombly, Plaintiffs
must sufficiently plead that they ‘are African Americans, describe[ ] [D]efendants’ actions
in detail, and allege[ ] that [D]efendants selected [P]laintiffs for maltreatment solely
because of their color.’ ” (citing Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (alter
ations in original))).
66. Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 477 F. App’x 722, 726 27 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirm
ing the district court’s decision that rejected Steed’s discrimination arguments for lack of
appropriate evidence. The court explained that “[w]hat Steed presented were the affidavits
of three other African Americans (in addition to his own testimony) who said that Ever
Home engaged in practices similar to those Steed complained of. The [district] court held
that this was not enough . . . . We find no fault in the district court’s holding.”).
67. See Barkley v. United Homes, L.L.C., 848 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(noting that the jury rejected the discrimination allegations of the plaintiffs). It is im
portant to note that in this case the plaintiffs were able to prove fraud and conspiracy to
commit fraud claims in six similar cases of predatory lending to African Americans, all
relating to properties in distressed neighborhoods of Brooklyn. Id. at 248. Given the evi
dent pattern of the six stories, it is hard to understand how evidence that was sufficient to
prove conspiracy to defraud was not enough to prove discrimination. In this case which is
a very extreme case of fraud the borrowers were eventually awarded compensation and
punitive damages, even despite the rejection of their discrimination allegations. Id. at 248
49. However, the rejection of the discrimination allegations is disconcerting for all other
cases in which less extreme circumstances of fraud are available.
68. M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d 538, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The
plaintiffs contend, however, that the defendants practice a form of discrimination by
lending or providing housing to a group of persons on less favorable terms than those
borrowers would have received if they were outside that particular class of persons.”).
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ly minority neighborhoods,” the court was skeptical of White’s ability
to prove that race was the sine qua non for the exploitation. To fully
appreciate the difficulty of satisfying the fourth element of the Hargraves test, it is worth highlighting judicial efforts made to distinguish between harms to African-Americans that may be attributed to
their race and harms to African-Americans which occur for “other”
(non-racial) reasons. Describing the difficulty the court said, “[a] jury
might well conclude that [the borrowers] were targeted not on the basis of being African-Americans, but because they were vulnerable . . . first-time home buyers who happened to be AfricanAmerican.”69 These words capture the identity trap inherent in the
“reverse redlining” cause of action. Borrowers relying on a cause of
action that emphasizes racial discrimination by reference to the historical problem of “redlining,” are probably going to fail at showing
that their modern credit problem necessarily stems from their racial
identity. In other words, it is precisely the borrowers’ allegation that
they were preyed upon as minorities and that these lending practices
were racially motivated that fails them.
Although the vulnerability is evident and undisputed, and the
lenders’ exploitative practices are apparent from the terms of the
predatory loan agreements and a host of other circumstances, these
borrowers still battle doubt and disbelief. Courts and juries are still
reluctant to accept the racial dimension of this issue and refuse to
conceptualize the problem in terms of racial classification. These borrowers face a colorblind judiciary,70 which accordingly raises the bar
for proving discrimination.
The Grimes’ litigation demonstrates exactly how high the bar has
been set. In 2011, the court dismissed their “reverse redlining” allegations, which they argued under the FHA and ECOA. The court allowed them, however, to amend their complaint to a similar discrimination argument made under the Civil Rights Act, thereby guiding
the Grimes, who still argued pro-se, to include factual proofs of discrimination in the amended complaint. The Grimes included data
regarding discrimination of African-American borrowers from other
litigations across the country, and in response the court dismissed
the discrimination argument and declared that the “allegations lack
any plausible factual basis.”71 The court’s condemnation of the Grimes’
efforts to tell the story of reverse redlining by relying on other cases is
69. Id. at 576.
70. In the legal context, the term “color blind,” goes back at least as far as Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“Our Constitution is color blind . . . .”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
71. Grimes v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 584, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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critical to our understanding of the trap and the extent of borrowers’
difficulties in litigating claims based on racial discrimination:
The Second Amended Complaints’ facial characteristics—the font,
the spacing, and stylistic inconsistencies, such as footnote call
numbers with no footnotes—led the Court to suspect that Plaintiffs had block[-]copied and pasted paragraphs from other complaints and court documents into their complaint. A few Internet
searches confirmed that suspicion.72

Given that reverse redlining is, to a great degree, a judge-made law,
why is it so hard to convince judges that concrete discrimination has
taken place when the general story of reverse redlining is so widely
accepted?
B. The Impact of an Anti-Classification Age
The judicial reluctance to frame predatory loan agreements as stories of discrimination mirrors the Supreme Court’s shifting jurisprudence of the Equal Protection Clause. Helping borrowers by seeing
them as victims of reverse redlining requires courts to take race into
account in a remedial manner, which resembles approving institutional affirmative action programs. To assist the underprivileged
based on their racial affiliation, courts would be expected to award
relief to African-American or Latino borrowers as victims of discrimination, while white borrowers—who consented to similar predatory
agreements—would not be eligible for similar relief. This inconsistency is justified by the need to remedy the negative impact of
decades of public and private subordination created by redlining policies. However, in accordance with the anti-classification principle,
the current leading interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,
courts—like any other government entity—are expected to show a
“commitment to protect individuals against all forms of racial classification, including ‘benign’ or ‘reverse.’ ”73 Some have even argued
that the Court has demonstrated an “anti-antidiscrimination agenda.”74 Similarly, when faced with the reverse redlining argument,
lower courts find themselves in their own version of the identity trap
where they are asked to engage in race-based classifications, which
conflicts with their inclination to adhere to the Supreme Court’s anti72. Id. In telling the Grimes’ story I do not mean to suggest that their technique was
in accordance with current legal procedure. My main goal is to demonstrate how
challenging is the task of a borrower, let alone and unrepresented borrower, who is trying
to prove discrimination in courts and how reliance on the general phenomenon even in
2013, after much information became public knowledge is not an option.
73. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 (2004) (emphasis added).
74. Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1142.
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classification principle.75 Such an identity trap leads to judicial hesitation, and leaves them reluctant to award relief based on the reverse
redlining cause of action, thereby threatening to empty this cause of
action from any practical meaning or utility.
Alternatively, Professor Yoshino has described these constitutional tendencies broadly as the process of “shutting down traditional
equality jurisprudence.”76 This “shutting down” process has two different manifestations. The first is also the one that has drawn most
scholarly attention: the Court’s refusal to add categories of classification to the five that are currently subject to the Court’s heightened
scrutiny.77 The second relates directly to the five protected categories.
With regard to these categories the Court has decreased its willingness to accept classification-based arguments, even when they were
founded on suspicious grounds such as race.
The most relevant feature of this judicial trend is related to the
efforts to prove state discrimination in the constitutional setting and
under the Equal Protection Clause. In this context, the Supreme
Court established a principle very similar to the one that was applied, years later and by a lower court, to Leo White. In Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,78 the Court significantly
constricted the ways in which discriminatory intent could be established. Although earlier cases accepted a proof of disparate impact on
a protected group as a way to establish discriminatory purpose,79 the
Feeney court required much more, stating: “ ‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness
of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected . . . a
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in
spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”80
Evidently, the requirement to prove the reason behind any act resulting in a disparate impact has made it much harder for victims of
discrimination to win in courts. Additionally, other decisions of the
Court have limited the standard of heightened scrutiny to facially
discriminating actions, according judicial deference to other—less

75. Some have noted that courts are more sensitive than other institutions to the
problem of classification partially because they “find a principled way” of making
distinctions among groups. See Yoshino, supra note 23, 758 59 (citing Justice White in City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
76. Id. at 749 n.17.
77. Id. at 756 (“The Supreme Court has formally accorded heightened scrutiny to clas
sifications based on five characteristics race, national origin, alienage, sex, and nonmarital
parentage.” (citations omitted)).
78. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
79. Yoshino, supra note 23, at 764.
80. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added).
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obviously discriminatory—acts that have a disparate impact on protected groups. As a whole, these changes had indeed “shut down”
many classification-based battles and had particularly significant
adverse effects on minorities. Since most acts of discrimination are
concealed and not facially discriminatory, and almost all affirmative
action programs are explicitly relying on race-based classifications,
minorities end up losing twice. They are deprived of both their protection from discrimination and their affirmative action-based
rights.81
To summarize: for reasons connected to broader constitutional
processes, reliance on the reverse redlining cause of action and discrimination arguments creates an identity trap. This identity trap
severely limits both borrowers’ and courts’ ability to cope with predatory lending. Therefore, in the coming section I step out of the legal
arena and focus on the redlined neighborhoods related to these loan
agreements. Such a geographical focus seeks to break away from an
identity-based framework, and instead develop a better understanding of the borrowers’ vulnerability. Shifting the focus from the lenders’ discriminatory behavior to that of the problematic environment
that yielded the borrowers’ consent carves out a potential escape
from the identity trap.
II. FOCUSING ON DISTRESSED NEIGHBORHOODS
Nearly 9 million Americans live in extreme-poverty neighborhoods,
places that also tend to be racially segregated and dangerous.82

The first Part told the story of Leo White, who failed to prove that
he was racially discriminated against. Setting discrimination aside,
while not denying it occurred, there remains much to learn from
White’s situation, which may reveal an alternative justification for
awarding him relief. The judicial decision contains invaluable information about White’s immediate environment, including the address
of the property that Mr. White bought with the money he borrowed:
164 Macon St. in Brooklyn, NY 11216. Significantly, out of the six
African-American borrowers in Barkley, one—an older woman named
Mary Lodge—used her loan to purchase a house at the same zip code
as Leo White, while the other five predatory loans in this litigation
related to properties in neighboring zip codes, all in east Brooklyn.83

81. Yoshino, supra note 23, 767 68.
82. Jens Ludwig et al., Neighborhood Effects on the Long Term Well Being of Low
Income Adults, 337 SCI. 1505, 1505 (2012).
83. Barkley v. Olympia Mortg. Co., Nos. 04 CV 875(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV
187(RJD)(KAM), 05 (CV) 4386(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5302(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV
5362(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5679(RJD)(KAM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95060, at *7 26
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When read in conjunction, the White and Barkley cases provide a
clearer pattern of predatory lending in Brooklyn’s distressed neighborhoods.
The most basic web search84 of zip code 11216 offers some context
regarding Leo White’s (and Mary Lodge’s) neighborhood at around
the time White signed his loan agreement: a densely crowded and
very poor urban neighborhood, predominately populated by minorities85 and with high levels of reported crime86—the kind of neighborhood that sociologists regularly define as a “distressed neighborhood”
or “disordered neighborhood.”87 It is the particularly harsh reality of

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010). The loans of the other five African American borrowers related to
three other zip codes: 11233 (three out of six borrowers), 11207 and 11212. Id.
84. For a discussion of conducting a judicially acceptable and even desired basic web
search method, see Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in
Federal Courts One Judge’s Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3 (2013).
85. Zip code 11216 ranks fortieth in the nation in population density. Population Den
sity in Brooklyn, NY by Zip Code, ZIP ATLAS, http://zipatlas.com/us/ny/brooklyn/zip code
comparison/population density.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). It is part of Brooklyn’s
known Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood. Parts of this broader area have been going
through gentrification in recent years, but despite this process the neighborhood it is still
described as populated by many low income families. For example, one report that relates
to the neighborhood states, “The income levels of our population are either non existent or
derisory.” Community Board No. 3, District Needs Statement Fiscal Year 2014, CITY OF
N.Y. 6, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/lucds/bk3profile.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
Another website reports that in 2004 the average Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) of residents
in zip code 11216 was less than half of the state average ($27,152 versus $59,519). 11216
Zip Code Detailed Profile, CITY DATA, http://www.city data.com/zips/11216.html
#ixzz3MHjGSZFM (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). The same website reports that this zip code
has a “[b]lack race population percentage significantly above state average.” Id. Conditions
were apparently even more difficult in 1999, when White signed his loan agreement and
purchased his home. Relying on the U.S. 2000 Census, one website, for example, reports
that income per household in zip code 11216 is currently $25,135 per annum. 11216 Zip
Code, http://zipcode.org/11216 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). For comparison, the state mean
income per household at the time White signed his loan agreement was more than double
($56,604). Table DP 1 Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/01000.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). At that
time zip code 11216 had eighty five percent non white residents. 11216 Zip Code,
http://zipcode.org/11216 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
86. According to one website, “Brooklyn (zip 11216), NY, violent crime, on a scale from
1 (low crime) to 100, is 82. . . . The US average is 41.4. Brooklyn (zip 11216), NY, property
crime, on a scale from 1 (low) to 100, is 80. . . . The US average is 43.5.” Crime in Brooklyn
(zip 11216), New York, SPERLING’S BEST PLACES, http://www.bestplaces.net/crime/zip
code/new york/brooklyn/11216 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
87. The terms “distressed neighborhood,” “disadvantaged neighborhood,” and
“disordered neighborhood” are used here interchangeably to refer to the most embattled
neighborhoods of our country and without adopting a particular definition. See, e.g.,
Terrence D. Hill et al., Neighborhood Disorder, Psychophysiological Distress, and Health,
46 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 170, 175 (2005) (defining neighborhood disorder as the
“conditions and activities, both major and minor, criminal and noncriminal, that residents
perceive to be signs of the breakdown of social order.”). It should be noted, however, that
researchers have developed and applied a new tool to assess neighborhood disorder the
“Neighborhood Inventory for Environmental Typology” (NIfETy). Adam J. Milam et al.,
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these distressed neighborhoods that may later allow for a different
conceptualization of the reverse redlining problem: one framed less
as an identity question that hinges on racial discrimination and more
as an issue of abuse of recognizable vulnerability.88 Numerous nonlegal studies can and should teach legal actors about how and why
the conditions in the worst neighborhoods of our country translate
into acute individual vulnerability of their residents. Focusing on a
borrower’s living conditions, rather than their race, allows a way out
of the previously described identity trap by making it easier for judges to concretely and empathetically relate to the borrower’s human
context. This shift in focus provides judges with an opportunity to
equally help all similarly situated borrowers without resorting to racial classification.
Moreover, emphasizing borrowers’ living conditions will better answer the question of why such borrowers would ever agree to a loan
that is against their interests, which remains an unresolved puzzle
under rational decision-making hypotheses that are so fashionable in
neoliberal legal analysis. The answer, offered by many non-legal disciplines, relates to stress as a leading cause of vulnerability, and the
impact of stress on decision-making. This article develops the answer
in two steps. First, it describes how residing in a distressed neighborhood imposes individual chronic stress on its residents. Next, it
shows how the negative impact of chronic stress on one’s decisionmaking process may render the borrower’s consent to predatory loan
agreements defective.
A. The Neighborhood Stress Process
Many studies show a strong correlation between living in distressed neighborhoods and the poor physical and mental health of
these neighborhoods’ residents; few studies attempt to explain this
association. Is this merely a reflection of the types of individuals who
live in these places, or is there an additional explanation? Surely the
personal characteristics of the disadvantaged residents in these
neighborhoods, such as their hereditary health problems or childhood
experiences, account for some of their reported health problems.
Nonetheless, the association is too strong to be exhausted by such
individualized explanations.89 Recently, researchers suggested that a
neighborhood’s uniquely disadvantaged social context, particularly
the stress it inflicts on its residents, more strongly links neighborNeighborhood Disorder and Juvenile Drug Arrests: A Preliminary Investigation Using the
NIfETy Instrument, 38 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 598, 598 (2012).
88. See infra Part III.
89. Hill et al., supra note 87, at 170, 173.
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hood conditions to their residents’ health than the residents’ individual characteristics.90 Simply put, life in disordered neighborhoods
causes chronic stress and chronic stress increases illness.
The leading professional understanding is that stress is a process
rather than a given condition. In brief, the stress process is tripartite—comprised of (1) stressors; (2) coping mechanisms; and (3) outcomes, both physical and mental, which emerge when stressors outweigh coping resources.91 Applying the framework of stress as a process is an invaluable component in delineating how the conditions in
distressed neighborhoods expose their residents to chronic stress and
its consequences. As described below, living in the worst neighborhoods exposes residents to the most intense clusters of stressors,
while depleting residents’ coping resources, thus leaving many with
enhanced individual chronic stress and with all the resulting health
problems and impaired capabilities. Understanding the important
link between living conditions and individual constraints counters
the public sentiment often reflected in legal analysis, that individuals
are solely responsible for their situation in life.92 This link suggests
that at times an individual’s status is attributable to deleterious aspects of their environment.93 The discussion below follows the structure of the stress process and uses it to explain the unique operation
of stress in the neighborhood setting. It describes the particular
stressors that are a part of life in such an environment, the reasons
for shortage of resources to cope with such stressors, and the outcomes of this disproportion between stressors and means of coping
with them. Further, it elucidates the perpetuation of neighborhood
distress, which makes the problem even more inescapable.
1. Stressors
Residents of disordered neighborhoods suffer from many environmental stressors, in addition to extreme poverty and any personal
90. See id.; Joongbaeck Kim, Neighborhood Disadvantage and Mental Health: The
Role of Neighborhood Disorder and Social Relationships, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 260, 260 (2010)
(describing findings which “indicate that residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods have
significantly higher levels of psychological distress than do residents of more advantaged
neighborhoods . . . .”).
91. Leonard I. Pearlin, The Sociological Study of Stress, 30 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV.
241, 241 (1989). What is known as “Pearlin’s Stress Process” has inspired much study of
stress using his model and understanding. See, e.g., ADVANCES IN THE CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF THE STRESS PROCESS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEONARD I. PEARLIN (William R. Avison et
al. eds., 2010). For a deeper discussion of the stress process, see Keren, supra note 30.
92. Carol S. Aneshensel et al., The Urban Neighborhood and Cognitive Functioning in
Late Middle Age, 52 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 163, 175 76 (2011).
93. Richard G. Wight et al., Urban Neighborhoods and Depressive Symptoms in Late
Middle Age, 33 RES. ON AGING 28, 30 (2011).
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sources of stress, such as sickness or divorce. Residents are exposed
daily, and without pause, to events, conditions, and behaviors that
carry a potential for danger and harm. Some stressors are social and
stem from human behavior, such as a high exposure to crime, violence, drug abuse, drinking in public, loitering of unsupervised youth,
vandalism, and the relentless presence of panhandlers and homeless
people. Other stressors stem from exposure to negative physical conditions, such as poor sanitation, run-down and abandoned buildings,
high levels of noise and pollution, graffiti, and neglected public facilities. In general, residents of such disordered neighborhoods also experience the decay of their surrounding environment and a loss of
civic control. The aforementioned words fail to fully capture the daily
horror that is inflicted on the people who live in any of the (too) many
distressed neighborhoods across the country. Therefore, I make use of
less traditional texts to vividly portray and illuminate how the stress
process manifests itself in the neighborhood context.
First of all, the name. What a sociologist refers to as a distressed
neighborhood is to others simply a “ghetto”—a crowded and isolated
urban setting, from which escape is unimaginable.94 In this “urban
nightmare”95 work has disappeared.96 In this war zone “helicopters
circle constantly overhead.”97 “I’m from the city of death . . .” says Lil
Wayne,98 while Ice T states, “I was born in America too. But does
South Central look like America to you?”99
The weight that these stressors bear on residents and the resulting sense of threat they endure is a phenomenon known as the clustering of stressors—i.e., when independent stressors, such as vandalism and noise, accumulate, converge, and proliferate.100 As one study
described it, “highly impoverished neighborhoods may be the source
of numerous chronic stressors.”101 Additionally, studies show the cu-

94. Hence the term “ghetto loans.” City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
09 2857 STA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011).
95. D. Marvin Jones, Fear of a Hip Hop Planet 38 (2013).
96. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR xiii (1996).
97. JONES, supra note 95, at 3.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 99.
100. RICHARD S. LAZARUS & SUSAN FOLKMAN, STRESS, APPRAISAL, AND COPING, 113
(1984) (explaining that the situation should “be considered in the context of the person’s
overall functioning, and in relation to what else is going on in the person’s life.”); see also
Pearlin, supra note 91, at 246 47.
101. Carl A. Latkin & Aaron D. Curry, Stressful Neighborhood and Depression: A
Prospective Study of the Impact of Neighborhood Disorder, 44 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 34,
36 (2003) (emphasis added).
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mulative effect of stressors over time and indicate that the longer the
exposure to neighborhood stressors, the greater their impact.102
By and large, residing in disordered neighborhoods creates what
some scholars have called “ambient threat”—signs and cues of impending danger. Ambient threat results from living in a noxious environment, being subject to constant signals of awaiting harm, and
experiencing community chaos, as well as other incivilities associated
with a breakdown of social control.103 In a rich, ethnographical account of a north Philadelphia ghetto, Alijah Anderson describes such
“ambient threat:”
Here, phrases like “watch your back” take on a literal meaning. . . . On corner after corner, young men peddle drugs the way a
newsboy peddles papers. . . . As we continue down the avenue,
more and more gaps in the rows of houses appear; these gaps represent places where buildings have burned down, have been torn
down, or have simply collapsed. . . . We pass a large building . . . gaily decorated with graffiti art, including a freshly painted
“memorial” for a young victim of street violence. . . . The idea of a
war zone springs to mind. Indeed, gunshot marks are evident on
some of the buildings.104

Needless to say, the emotional toll of this kind of life is significant
and is compounded by emotions of fear, anxiety, and anger that can
be interpreted as additional stressors or, as explained below, factors
that work to impair residents’ resilience.105
Finally, race surely plays a role in the neighborhood context. It
does so, not as a sole factor that drags us back to the identity problem, but as an additional stressor that augments the other stressors
and amplifies the individual stress of residing in a distressed neighborhood.106 Since minorities are the majority in neighborhoods of con102. See, e.g., Philippa Clarke et al., Cumulative Exposure to Neighborhood Context:
Consequences for Health Transitions Over the Adult Life Course, 36 RES. ON AGING 115, 116
(2014); see also LAZARUS & FOLKMAN, supra note 100, at 98 (explaining that where a
stressful situation persists over time, it is more likely to “wear the person down
psychologically and physically”).
103. See, e.g., Catherine E. Ross & John Mirowsky, Neighborhood Disorder, Subjective
Alienation, and Distress, 50 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 49, 50 (2009).
104. ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL
LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 26, 30 31 (1999).
105. See, e.g., Carol S. Aneshensel, Neighborhood as a Social Context of the Stress Pro
cess, in ADVANCES IN THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE STRESS PROCESS 35 (Avison et al.
eds., 2010).
106. See Elizabeth Brondolo et al., Racism as a Psychological Stressor, in THE
HANDBOOK OF STRESS SCIENCE: BIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY AND HEALTH 167 (Richard J.
Constrada & Andrew Baum eds., 2011); see also Shelly P. Harrell, A Multidimensional
Conceptualization of Racism Related Stress: Implications for the Well Being of People of
Color, 70 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 42, 45 46 (2000).
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centrated poverty and mobility (leaving the neighborhood) is nearly
impossible, one result is lasting racial segregation.107 Such segregation reinforces racial differences in access to opportunities and resources outside the neighborhood. This disparity adds one more layer
to any given level of stress, and increases exposure to the intense
stressor of discrimination. Overall, there is a growing consensus that
residents of distressed neighborhoods endure a prolonged exposure to
a uniquely intense combination of stressors.
2. Coping
When people are exposed to similar stressors, the resulting stress
they experience still varies, and is mainly attributed to differences in
their access to the resources available for coping with such stressors.
Neighborhood distress not only intensifies residents’ exposure to
stressors, it also has a significant negative impact on residents’ ability to cope with those stressors. As studies explain, there are various
ways in which neighborhood distress works to deplete residents’ material, social, and mental resources—all of which are essential resources for both alleviating and coping with the impact of stressors.
In fact, some scholars have defined distressed neighborhoods as areas
that suffer from the “simultaneous absence of economic, social, and
family resources.”108
First, even seemingly “personal” coping resources one possesses
are highly influenced by the environment in which a person lives.
Neighborhoods play a determinative role in one’s education, income,
social ties, attitude, and level of confidence. For example, growing up
in a disadvantaged neighborhood limits one’s educational opportunities and may damage one’s self-esteem, both of which are crucial to
one’s ability to cope with stressors.109 To illustrate, when schools look
and feel like high security prisons and have no libraries or even working bathrooms,110 fewer personal coping resources are accumulated.
Second, the ambient threat discussed earlier, or the perceived
dangerousness of distressed neighborhood streets, creates a fear of
walking around one’s neighborhood. This increases residents’ tendency to retreat socially and psychologically from their communities by
remaining indoors, staying away from certain sites, avoiding
107. See, e.g., Sara Aronchick Solow, Racial Justice at Home: The Case for Opportunity
Housing Vouchers, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 491 (2010) (describing the “phenomenon of
racial ghettoization” and explaining that “[i]n 2000, African Americans were the strong
majority, constituting 60% or more of the population, in nearly half of the country’s ‘high
poverty’ areas”).
108. Aneshensel, supra note 105, at 36.
109. Solow, supra note 107, at 493 95.
110. JONES, supra note 95, at 108 09.
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strangers, and generally keeping to themselves.111 Parents who want
to keep their kids alive and out of trouble keep them at home. A
twenty-five-year-old woman who grew up in a drug-infested neighborhood reflected about her social life, saying: “I didn’t have too many
friends in the community, because, like I said, my mother kept me
inside the house. . . . I didn’t really go outside.”112 The resulting isolation deprives residents of a leading resource in coping with stressors:
an effective social support system. Such an impeding alienation is
further enhanced by the neighborhood’s physical conditions, especially by the typical scarcity of safe and inviting public gathering places
that are abundant in better neighborhoods—such as lush green
parks, vibrant community centers, rich libraries, shiny shopping
malls, and well-maintained sports facilities. Therefore, residents of
deprived neighborhoods have very meager opportunities to comfortably meet with each other and engage in conversations and other social exchanges that are a must for coping with stress.113
Third, many of the stressors typical to distressed neighborhoods—
such as crime and decay—are beyond individual residents’ control.
Residents’ inability to exercise control over such stressors adds to
these stressors’ negative impact by depleting the residents’ specific
ability to cope.114 Further, the lack of control present in such chaotic
conditions broadly suggests a breakdown of social control and abandonment by the authorities. In the face of such cues, residents often
develop an intense sense of helplessness115 and powerlessness116 that
further undermines their resilience. This psychological internalizing
process, sometimes called “structural amplification,”117 also sabotages
hope—an affective disposition that is indispensable for any effective
111. See, e.g., Allison T. Chappell et al., Broken Windows or Window Breakers: The
Influence of Physical and Social Disorder on Quality of Life, 28 JUST. Q. 522, 522 23 (2011).
112. ANDERSON, supra note 104, at 54.
113. See Agnes E. van den Berg et al., Green Space as a Buffer Between Stressful Life
Events and Health, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1203 (2010).
114. Flora I. Matheson et al., Urban Neighborhoods, Chronic Stress, Gender and
Depression, 63 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2604, 2612 (2006) (“Uncontrollable stressors are
documented to undermine health more so than controllable ones.”).
115. See ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, WHY ZEBRAS DON’T GET ULCERS: THE ACCLAIMED
GUIDE TO STRESS, STRESS RELATED DISEASES, AND COPING 494 95 (3d ed. 2004) (offering a
review of learned helplessness literature in the context of stress and depression); see
generally MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND
DEATH (1975) (one of the most influential works in psychology in general and the definitive
book on the subject of learned helplessness in particular).
116. Ross & Mirowsky, supra note 103, at 51 (defining “perceived powerlessness” as
“the learned and generalized expectation that one has little control over meaningful
circumstances in one’s life”).
117. Catherine E. Ross & John Mirowsky, The Sense of Personal Control: Social
Structural Causes and Emotional Consequences, in HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF
MENTAL HEALTH 393 (Carol S. Aneshensel et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013).
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coping.118 After all, “[i]f one can’t influence conditions and events in
one’s own life, what hope is there for the future?”119 Most pertinent to
our engagement with predatory lending to residents of distressed
neighborhoods, studies show that in an atmosphere where residents
constantly feel powerless, residents may also feel “unable to fend off
attempts at exploitation.”120
Finally—linked to both the problem of social isolation and the
sense of powerlessness—residents of distressed neighborhoods often
feel further alienated, because they cannot trust civil institutions and
private members of their own community. One major problem is the
residents’ complex relationship with the police. While residents of
affluent neighborhoods view police as symbols of law and order, the
case is profoundly different in disordered neighborhoods. Despite
these being high-crime areas characterized by frequent emergencies
and violent events, the innocent residents “sometimes fail to call the
police because they believe that the police are unlikely to come . . . .”121
“911 is a joke”, declares Public Enemy, “Don’t you see how late
they’re reactin’[?]”122
Or, if the cops do come, residents are often afraid that they may
“harass the very people who called them.”123 Such police misconduct is
frequently described by hip-hop artists, who regularly voice the concerns of the younger residents of “the ’hood.”124 For example, Akil b
STRANGe recently responded to the notorious “stop-and-frisk” policy
in American Secrets: New York City, by explicitly referring to its resulting stress.125 He raps: “I became aware of the inequities between
them . . . and me. Like how much tenser I would be with cops in the
vicinity?”126

118. Kathy Abrams & Hila Keren, Legal Hopes: Enhancing Resilience Through the
External Cultivation of Positive Emotions, 64 N. IRELAND L. Q. 111 (2013).
119. Ross & Mirowsky, supra note 103, at 51; see also Latkin & Curry, supra note
101, at 41.
120. Ross & Mirowsky, supra note 117, at 393.
121. ANDERSON, supra note 104, at 321.
122. PUBLIC ENEMY, 911 is a Joke, in FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (Def Jam Recordings
1990).
123. ANDERSON, supra note 104, at 321.
124. See MURRAY FORMAN, THE ’HOOD COMES FIRST: RACE, SPACE, AND PLACE IN RAP
AND HIP HOP (2002) (describing the specific emphasis on real neighborhoods and streets in
rap music and hip hop culture as an urgent response to the cultural and geographical
ghettoization of black urban communities).
125. Sarah Barness, Stop and Frisk Rap Video Sends Powerful Message About NYPD
and Racial Profiling, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2013, 12:37 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/15/stop and frisk rap n 4101842.html.
126. Id.
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Often, there is an additional anxiety resulting from the belief that
engaging with the police or seeking police assistance will be perceived by other neighbors as snitching and will trigger social condemnation or even acts of retaliation. For example, Nickie, a twentysix-year-old resident of a distressed neighborhood and a mother of
four, “is fearful of being labeled a “snitch” or “hot.”127 She explains:
“Around here, if you snitch on somebody, especially if you go to court
and testify, you’re a done deal.”128
Generally, sentiments of fear and distrust of the police and other
legal institutions are perpetuated by a reality of lawlessness and
lack of civil order, “most-notably in the presence of open-air drug
dealing and the prevalence of functioning crack houses.” 129 The resulting lack of civil order exacerbates feelings of isolation and on
the whole takes its toll on residents. It particularly may explain
why residents who faced exploitation by lenders would feel powerless to cope with the pressure and indisposed to formally complain
or otherwise seek legal aid.
3. Outcomes
The link between residing in impoverished neighborhoods and suffering from individual chronic stress is not only explained by the fact
that such localities are replete with excessive stressors and lack the
necessary resources to buffer them. It is further validated by many
findings of a strong association between such residency and the
known outcomes of the individual condition of distress. At the individual level, prolonged stress can produce both immediate and longterm consequences, which run the gamut from the physiological, to
the cognitive, and to the psychological. In many disciplines, the study
of stress has focused mainly on the negative effect of distress on people’s health and well-being. Years of studies have produced a body of
findings too vast to be summarized here.130 Significantly, the leading
symptoms of the individual condition of distress are strikingly com-

127. Monica C. Bell, From Legal Cynicism to Situational Trust 13 (Harvard Univ.,
Working Paper, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
2310016.
128. Id.
129. ANDERSON, supra note 104, at 321.
130. It shows, inter alia, that distress is strongly associated with a variety of severe
diseases, with speeding the aging and the death of brain cells, and with the development of
mental illness. See, e.g., SHAWN M. TALBOTT, THE CORTISOL CONNECTION: WHY STRESS
MAKES YOU FAT AND RUINS YOUR HEALTH AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 81 (2007);
see also Keren, supra note 30 (reviewing and explaining the most known symptoms of
distress).
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mon among residents of disordered and disadvantaged neighborhoods, even when controlling for personal circumstances.131
Perhaps the most salient findings in this context are those regarding depression. Many works highlight the strong bond between individual stress and depression and its ties to the secretion of stress
hormones.132 Critically, numerous studies show a sound association
between perceived neighborhood disorder and subsequent depressive
symptoms, even after adjusting for baseline depressive indicators.133
Indeed, at least one study offered a neighborhood-based outlook at
depression, suggesting that “it may be possible to identify neighborhoods, rather than individuals, that are at risk for depression.”134 Recently, another study suggested that neighborhood context “matters
to depressive symptoms over and above individual characteristics.”135
This finding is extremely relevant to the legal arguments made in the
context of predatory lending. Indeed, some researchers have challenged the individualistic response of society to the problem of stress
and the inclination to hold persons solely responsible for their health
and mental condition. Instead, those researchers have suggested that
society should be at least partially accountable and that a neighborhood-based intervention might be more apposite.136
Overall, the findings regarding neighborhood-based depression
have salience in the legal context of predatory lending. When people
are under stress, further compounded by depression, there is very
little they can actively do to resist exploitation by others. There is a
131. See generally Ana V. Diez Roux & Christina Mair, Neighborhoods and Health,
1186 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 125 (2010) (reviewing the literature).
132. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 115, at 271 309 (discussing the strong ties between
stress and depression); see also TALBOTT, supra note 130, at 23 (describing the link
between over and under exposure to cortisol and stress related depression); David A.
Gutman & Charles B. Nemeroff, Stress and Depression, in THE HANDBOOK OF STRESS,
supra note 106, at 353 (“It is evident that inexorable link exists between stress and
depression, and new research has dramatically increased our understanding of the
relationship between the two.”).
133. Matheson et al., supra note 114, at 2604 (“[T]he daily stress of living in a neigh
borhood where residential mobility and material deprivation prevail is associated with
depression.”); Ross & Mirowsky, supra note 103, at 49 (arguing that that living in such
threatening, noxious, and dangerous contexts may lead individuals to experience negative
affective states such as anxiety, depression, and anger); Wight et al., supra note 93, at 44
(reporting findings from empirical work that showed “that neighborhood socioeconomic
disadvantage is significantly and positively associated with depressive symptomatology
among late middle age adults, controlling for individual level sociodemographic character
istics a ‘main effect’ finding”).
134. Latkin & Curry, supra note 101, at 41.
135. Wight et al., supra note 93, at 46 (emphasis added).
136. Id. (“Our findings suggest that these individuals are not solely responsible for
their emotional well being, but that some part of their mental health status is attributable
to aversive aspects of their environment. Thus, our findings support expanding policy
discussions to focus on community based interventions . . . . ”).
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proven connection between stress, depression, and impaired agency.
A frequent feature of major depression is “psychomotor retardation”—a severe decrease in the ability to concentrate or act, which
makes even simple activities, such as making an appointment or
getting dressed in the morning, exhausting and nearly impossible to
accomplish.137
To summarize: residing in a distressed neighborhood is associated
with all the leading individual outcomes, which typify the chronic
stress condition. While these unfortunate outcomes appear to be individual, their source is mainly social: a result of living in a toxic environment as opposed to the consequence of individual choice-making.
4. A Vicious Cycle
The distressed neighborhood’s bleak reality reinforces itself in a
vicious self-perpetuating cycle of stress. The conditions of the neighborhood create stressors, deplete coping resources, and create harmful outcomes that in turn function as new clusters of stressors and an
additional cause of depletion of coping capabilities, leading to more
outcomes of illness and impairment of agency and decision-making
capabilities. Stress and depression, for example, often lead to drug
use and increased alcohol consumption.138 Drug use and alcoholism
foster neighborhood disorder, which then leads to more stress and
depression within the neighborhood.139 Furthermore, the empty
streets phenomenon, created by mistrust and social withdrawal, and
a neighborhood’s general lack of institutional control and supervision, allows for more social disorder, crime, and violence in the
streets. This naturally adds to residents’ apprehensions and reinforces the initial tendency to disconnect.140 As a result of this downward
spiral, residents of distressed neighborhoods are very vulnerable and
particularly attractive prey for geographically based exploitation.141

137. SAPOLSKY, supra note 115, at 275.
138. For drugs, see, for example, Milam et al., supra note 87. For alcohol consumption,
see, for example, Terrence D. Hill & Ronald J. Angel, Neighborhood Disorder, Psychological
Distress, and Heavy Drinking, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 965 (2005).
139. Latkin & Curry, supra note 101, at 41.
140. See, e.g., Chappell et al., supra note 111, at 152 (“According to Wilson and
Kelling’s broken windows theory, physical and social disorder lead to fear and cause
citizens to retreat into their homes. This breaks down informal social control mechanisms
and may lead to more serious crime.”).
141. Ross & Mirowsky, supra note 103, at 53 (“Mistrusting individuals help create and
maintain the very conditions that seem to justify their beliefs. Their preemptive actions
may elicit hostile responses, and their diminished ability to participate in networks of
reciprocity and mutual assistance may have several consequences: Without allies they are
easy targets of crime and exploitation; when victimized or exploited they cannot share their
economic or emotional burden with others; and, by not providing aid and assistance to
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The main take-away from a non-legal investigation of the connection between life in a distressed neighborhood and chronic stress is
the social nature of the problem. Greedy lenders targeted these individuals because of their apparent vulnerability, a vulnerability which
stems from social conditions for which society should be held accountable. To the legal system, this insight identifies a need to take
social aspects into account, rather than framing the predatory lending issue in terms of individualistic decisions in a free-market game.
Recognizing that the lenders’ motivation was to make private profits
out of a social problem can offer courts justification for intervention.
Such justification is based on a specific reality, in a particular neighborhood. As such it does not trigger the classification problem and
the identity trap that results from it. Rather, it creates a need for judicial response that discourages predatory lending. The next section
will further draw on non-legal studies to explain how the social problem of distressed neighborhoods can end in defective individual decisions to agree to patently predatory contracts.
B. Chronic Stress and Impaired Decision-Making
One of the leading effects of stress is on cognitive processes. Stress
is described as interfering with such processes and studies particularly show that prolonged stress can “wreak havoc with decisionmaking.”142 This is particularly true of the impact of chronic stress associated with life in a distressed neighborhood.143 Since consenting to
contracts like the predatory loan agreements discussed here is the
product of a decision-making process, this symptom is especially deserving of our attention. What impact may individual chronic stress
have over the effectiveness of the decision-making processes?
1. Stress and Decision-Making
Although the intersection of decision-making models and stress
theories has yet to be fully developed,144 stress theorists believe that

others they weaken the community’s power to forestall victimization and exploitation and
to limit its consequences.”).
142. HENRY L. THOMPSON, THE STRESS EFFECT: WHY SMART LEADERS MAKE DUMB
DECISIONS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 117 (2010). This section is based on my former
work regarding the general impact of stress. See generally Keren, supra note 30.
143. See, e.g., Philippa Clarke et al., supra note 102, at 119 (“Increased stress exposure
in disadvantaged neighborhoods . . . may result in a prolonged elevation of stress response
systems that produces physiologic changes in a body’s immune system, brain function, and
inflammation[] . . . .”).
144. KENNETH R. HAMMOND, JUDGMENTS UNDER STRESS 25 27 (2000) (describing the
“gulf” that separates theorists of stress from decision making researchers).
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“chronic stress can lead to dysfunctional decision-making.”145 Specifically, judgments made while under stress are limited, because the
brain is consumed by the need to cope with the stressors and their
outcomes.
For decades, scholars who research the cognitive impacts of stress
have expressed a consensus of opinion that “[t]he competence of human judgment is decreased by stress.”146 However, only recent developments in neuroscience have allowed researchers access to the precise brain processes triggered by exposure to stress. The current findings, albeit not conclusive, reveal how stress impairs high-order brain
abilities that are essential for effective decision-making, specifically
those operations performed by the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Under
non-stress conditions, the PFC orchestrates the “intelligent regulation of behavior, thought and emotion.”147 Under conditions of psychological stress, however, stress hormones interfere with that regulation. Evolutionarily geared to prepare the body for a “fight-or-flight”
response,148 those hormones limit the ability of the brain to do other,
less urgent, tasks. Specifically, they limit memory and attention regulation, as well as other complex brain activities the PFC performs.
Therefore, under stressful conditions, the amount and quality of information we can recall, process, and store declines.149 On the other
hand, the high levels of stress hormones strengthen the function of
other regions of the brain; the hormones released under stress
“switch the brain from thoughtful, reflective regulation by the PFC to
more rapid reflexive regulation by the amygdala and other subcortical structures.”150 While such brain processes may be efficient when
people are coping with a physical threat, when expected to make rational choices that require analysis, self-control, and long-term thinking, this type of brain function is fundamentally detrimental.151 It can
lead to dysfunctional decision-making.152

145. Eduardo Dias Ferreira et al., Chronic Stress Causes Frontostriatal Reorganization
and Affects Decision Making, 325 SCI. 621, 625 (2009).
146. HAMMOND, supra note 144, at 6; see generally IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN,
DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT
(1977) (discussing, inter alia, the impact of stress on the decision making process).
147. Amy F. T. Arnsten, Stress Signalling Pathways that Impair Prefrontal Cortex
Structure and Function, 10 NAT’L REV. NEUROSCI. 410, 411 (2009).
148. See id. at 415.
149. THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 136.
150. Arnsten, supra note 147, at 415.
151. Id. In addition, chronic, prolonged stress may even lead to structural, longer term
changes in the PFC. Id. at 418 19.
152. See generally Dias Ferreira et al., supra note 145.
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2. Stress and the Consideration of Alternatives
Under contract law, the enforcement of predatory loan agreements
signed under stress depends, inter alia, on the existence of reasonable alternatives.153 Thus, it is imperative to understand the impact of
stress not only on the final decision, but also particularly on one’s
ability to recognize and assess existing alternatives before signing
the contract. While careful appraisal of alternatives is essential to
every decision-making process,154 it is very difficult to fully consider
other options while under stress when one “can’t think straight.”155
As noted, the problem stems from the release of stress hormones that
cause arousal, which in turn creates hasty and impulsive patterns of
behavior that lead to ineffective decision-making. Such impulsive
patterns were observed in an experimental study that focused specifically on the way stress influences a person’s ability to scan and consider available alternatives.
This alternatives study, which compared “the manner in which
stressed and unstressed individuals consider and scan decision alternatives,”156 is often cited in the decision-making literature to explain
how stress limits the ability to choose between alternatives.157 One
hundred and one students participated in the study and took a computerized multiple-choice analogies test containing fifteen questions.158 Students were asked to choose the correct answer out of six
alternatives that were presented separately on the screen.159 They
were able to navigate freely between the reviewable alternatives and
to control both the order and the speed of their review.160 To choose
153. The doctrines of duress and unconscionability that are often considered as possible
sources of relief (non enforcement) both require the party seeking relief to show lack of
reasonable alternatives. In other words, when a reasonable alternative existed and one
consented to a specific contract instead of following this alternative, the legal assumption is
that such consent was valid and the contract should therefore be enforced.
154. Irving L. Janis, Decisionmaking Under Stress, in HANDBOOK OF STRESS:
THEORETICAL AND CLINICAL ASPECTS 60 (Leo Goldberger & Shlomo Breznitz eds., 2d ed.
1993) (describing the vigilance that is required to cope with stress and stating that
vigilance exists when “[t]he decisionmaker searches painstakingly for relevant infor
mation[] . . . and appraises alternatives carefully before making a choice”).
155. THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 159.
156. Giora Keinan, Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Under
Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52 J. P ERSONALITY & SOC. P SYCHOL. 639, 640
(1987).
157. See, e.g., HAMMOND, supra note 144, at 170, 172, 176, 216; Dan Zakay, The Impact
of Time Perception Processes on Decision Making Under Time Stress, in TIME PRESSURE
AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 59, 60 (Ola Svenson & A. John
Maule eds., 1993).
158. Keinan, supra note 156, at 640 41.
159. Id. at 640.
160. Id.
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one of the alternatives, the students had to press the “enter” key,
which then prompted the display of the next question on the
screen.161 The study recorded the time that the students spent reviewing each alternative, as well as the sequence by which the alternatives were visited.162 The main goal was to trace the method of the
decision-making process, rather than to simply measure the quality
of the end result.163 The participants were randomly divided into two
groups: some were only asked to do their best, while others had to
take the test under stress created as part of the experiment.164
The results of the alternatives study were remarkable. The participants under stress demonstrated a significantly inferior performance compared to their non-stressed counterparts. First, stress had
the detrimental effect of “premature closure,” defined as making a
decision before all available alternatives were considered.165 Although
few non-stressed participants engaged in premature closure, 80% of
the cases where alternatives were ignored occurred among the distressed subjects.166 In fact, many of those subjects “chose an answer
before they had even seen the correct alternative.”167
Second, stress also caused “nonsystematic scanning,” defined as a
disorganized and scattered method of review in which the stressed
decision-maker “searches frantically for a way out of the dilemma,
and rapidly shifts back and forth between alternatives.”168 Recording
every departure from a serial sequence of review,169 the study demonstrated significantly deficient scanning patterns in the distressed
groups. Compared to the non-stressed participants, subjects under
stress visited the alternative answers in a much more scattered and
disorderedly fashion.170
Finally, in terms of “quality of performance,” defined as choosing
the right answers, subjects under stress decided incorrectly at a
higher rate than their counterparts. Notably, the distressed did not
161. Id.
162. Id. at 641.
163. Id. at 640.
164. Notably, time pressure was not used to stress the participants: they were free to
review each alternative for as much time as they needed and to revisit alternatives that
seemed to require more attention. Instead, this study utilized the threat of electric shock as
a stressor. Keinan, supra note 156, at 641. While time pressure would predictably yield a
rushed style of decision making, it is not as readily apparent how being under a different
kind of stress impacts one’s ability to analyze alternatives.
165. Id. at 639.
166. Id. at 642.
167. Id. at 643.
168. Id. at 639 (citing Janis, supra note 154, at 72).
169. Id. at 641 (explaining the measurement of that aspect of the performance).
170. Id. at 642.
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simply choose the wrong answer more often. Rather, the study
showed a strong correlation between incomplete patterns of the
scanning of alternatives and decreased quality of performance; 67%
of the cases of premature closure, for example, led to choosing an incorrect answer.171 The alternatives study thus demonstrates that
stress significantly impairs the ability to consider alternatives and
leads to flawed decision-making.172
3. Back to the Neighborhood
To reside in a distressed neighborhood potentially increases the
cumulative impact of stress on cognitive functioning. The neighborhood’s challenging conditions not only result in individual chronic
stress, which interferes with cognitive functioning, but also directly
operate at the environmental level to constrain cognitive performance. As researchers of neighborhood distress have compellingly
argued, “impoverished neighborhoods foster poor cognitive functioning because such neighborhoods restrict opportunities for socially derived cognitive stimulation.”173 Importantly, such lack of stimulation
is tightly linked to the previously discussed neighborhood stressors.
To illustrate, when residents isolate themselves socially in response
to environmental threats, it limits their interaction with others, and
often causes reduced cognitive performance.174 The limited stimulation available to residents of distressed neighborhoods can be further
attributed to the lack of other institutional sources, which are commonly available in more affluent neighborhoods, such as public libraries, concert halls, and museums.
Thus, when we combine the findings regarding the impact of both
individual and neighborhood stress on cognitive functioning, it becomes
apparent that residents of distressed neighborhoods are especially prone
to manipulation by sophisticated and powerful actors. Since this particular susceptibility is not the product of individual flaws, but rather a
socially created phenomenon that has been facilitated by long years of
public neglect, it necessitates measures of protection.

171. Id.
172. Although the nature of the experiment did not require lengthy consideration of
each of the alternatives other works also demonstrate that stress shortens the time
dedicated to the assessment of each alternative. See id. at 640, 642 43 (discussing
“temporal narrowing”).
173. Carol S. Aneshensel et al., The Urban Neighborhood and Cognitive Functioning in
Late Middle Age, 52 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 163, 164 (2011).
174. Id.
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE: PROTECTION WITHOUT CLASSIFICATION
Identity has become local, defined less by race than by whether or
not you are from the hood.175

If the reverse redlining cause of action creates an identity trap (as
argued in Part I) for those in need of relief, and historically redlined
neighborhoods contribute to individual vulnerability (as argued in
Part II), how should the legal system respond to exploitation that occurs as a result of such vulnerability? To answer this complex question I find it necessary to deviate from the neoliberal paradigm and
draw on the vulnerability theory. The neoliberal paradigm conceptualizes people as autonomous, self-sufficient, freethinking, and rational beings, who therefore should be held accountable for their mistakes and not rely on the state for help.176 In contrast, the vulnerability theory creates a causal relationship between the conditions of individuals in their respective communities and the state’s actions and
deficiencies (or inactions), which therefore require the state to respond to such inequalities and vulnerabilities.177
As a starting point, it is imperative to identify an effective legal
reaction to predatory lending, because the state has a duty to respond in a manner that recognizes its accountability for the creation
and enhancement of socially produced vulnerabilities. In fact, one
court has even stated, albeit in a different context, that the state has
more than a duty: “the State has an interest in protecting vulnerable
groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from
abuse, neglect, and mistakes.”178 A responsive state ought to find legal solutions to the problem of predatory loan agreements; it should
not leave people who were preyed upon, like Leo White, to fend for
themselves after they were exploited due to their vulnerability.
As shown in Part III, the state played an integral part in creating
borrowers’ vulnerability by failing to rehabilitate distressed neighborhoods and allowing them to grow unchecked. In addition, the state
has deregulated the financial markets and has therefore permitted
and even incentivized the use of predatory lending techniques
against the residents of these distressed neighborhoods. Moreover,
the state simultaneously acted to urge poor residents of these neighborhoods to take out loans and become homeowners. In the same
175. JONES, supra note 95, at 4.
176. See, e.g., Fineman, The Responsive State, supra note 33, at 251 52 (“[I]n the
United States, the state is restrained from interference in the name of individual liberty,
autonomy, and paramount principles such as freedom of contract.”).
177. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 33, at 10 (explaining the
vulnerability theory).
178. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (emphasis added).
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vein, reverse redlining can be seen as governmental “greenlining,”179
where a green light is given for any “creative” method of lending.
Accordingly, since the state has played its part in creating the
problem, a responsive state should intervene, take legal action, and
seek to alleviate the resulting consequences. Notably, by not responding appropriately, the state is not simply refraining from interfering
in the market, as suggested by the neoliberal paradigm. Rather, a
lack of intervention means that the state plays both an active and
negative role: it exacerbates inequalities and promotes exploitation.
Accordingly, when the anti-classification approaches have decreased
the use of reverse redlining as a cause of action, another doctrine
must be found to facilitate a response to predatory loan agreements.
To avoid the identity trap, an alternative legal theory should be
based on a contextual analysis of the conditions that allowed the proliferation of predatory loan agreements. One essential component,
which was explained in Part II with compelling scientific support, is
the association between the areas that were targeted by lenders and
the vulnerability of the borrowers residing in those areas. To focus on
vulnerability as a universal human condition—the fact that as human beings we are all vulnerable but in different ways—may allow
important progress.180 It can free us from the jurisprudential concerns that are increasingly ascribed to the traditional categories of
classification. Beyond this, courts can then truly examine the concrete condition of the borrower seeking relief and take into account a
combination of circumstantial factors which are not captured by the
borrower’s racial identity. To illustrate, and without denying the
conditions unique to women or minorities, a vulnerable borrower who
deserves legal help may as well be an elderly white man who resides
in a distressed neighborhood, even if the neighborhood is admittedly
primarily consists of minorities.
Therefore, a more promising approach is a context-based analysis
of borrowers’ vulnerability and the ways in which it was exploited by
lenders, especially given the poor results of the efforts to utilize a reverse redlining cause of action.181 The field of law that both fits the
179. I borrow the term from Hernandez, supra note 39, at 188.
180. This insistence on “beyond identity” analysis is an essential component of the
vulnerability theory. See Fineman, The Responsive State, supra note 33, at 254 (explaining
the “troubling aspects of the identity approach to equality,” especially since “in the United
States there is no constitutional guarantee to basic social goods, such as housing,
education, or health care” and proposing the broader concept of vulnerability as an
alternative).
181. Reverse redlining could have been interpreted on geographical basis as referring
to the conditions in the historically redlined areas and therefore not as an identity based
cause of action. However, courts have systematically required that borrowers will prove
belonging to a minority group. See supra Part I for a description of elements.
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problem of predatory agreements and offers doctrines that allow a
contextual legal response to the problem, is contract law. Thus, the
next section introduces a new contractual framework and discusses
its pros and cons in comparison to the existing anti-discrimination
model.
A. Using Contract Law to Address Exploitation
How can contract law help deal with predatory loan agreements
struck between sophisticated lenders and borrowers who reside in
distressed neighborhoods? I have elaborated elsewhere on the interplay of contracts and stress and the ways in which contract law
should take into account the fact that stress can impair consent to a
degree that justifies not legally enforcing the contract.182 Following
this general framework, I now suggest that courts can and should
engage in evaluating each borrower’s concrete level of stress-based
vulnerability at the time of consent to an exploitive loan agreement.
Focusing on the personal vulnerability at a specific point in time, rather than on fixed categories of identity, can facilitate a judicial review that is uniquely tailored to the individual seeking relief, while—
and this is crucial—not failing to consider the social context to which
this individual was subjected.
To accomplish this individualized but socially-sensitive review, a
“totality of circumstances” style test should be carefully developed. It
should include the neighborhood’s conditions and the impact of living
in such a challenging and disempowering environment. These environmental aspects should be combined with any personal information, such as the health or age of the borrower. Since “[i]dentity
has become local,”183 attention should be given, for example, to the
length of exposure to the neighborhood’s environment; the conditions
of the specific neighborhood; the existence or absence of social services; and the individual symptoms of distress, such as diagnosed depression or medically treated insomnia, and so on.184 The more the
analysis of the circumstances depicts the borrower’s vulnerability,
the greater the willingness to award relief. Most relevant to the problem of the identity trap discussed in Part II is that engaging in such
concrete evaluation will free courts currently reluctant to consider
discrimination arguments under the “reverse redlining” framework.
Using contract law to cope with an exploitation of vulnerability
that was done via use of contracts is a natural and candid legal re182. See Keren, supra note 30.
183. JONES, supra note 95, at 4.
184. For a detailed discussion of why and how courts could pay attention to depression
and insomnia as leading signs of stress, see Keren, supra note 30.
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sponse. It is also attainable and conveniently requires no legal reform. Courts can utilize existing doctrines that are already designed
to prevent market misbehavior to directly deny the enforcement of
inappropriately achieved contracts. The leading doctrines that serve
this purpose are, in no particular order: duress, undue influence, unconscionability, and misrepresentation. Without delving into their
particular elements and related case law, they all share three leading
features: a gap of power between the parties; inappropriate behavior
by the stronger party; and a resulting consent of the weaker party to
a harmful agreement. By offering deserving weaker parties’ relief in
the form of non-enforcement or partial enforcement of contracts,185
courts have at their disposal both the authority and the tools necessary
to properly respond to exploitation of vulnerability. Thus, they can
prevent the exploiters from enjoying the fruits of their misbehavior.
A judicial review that focuses on the exploitation of borrowers’
vulnerability (for now, without regard to which specific contractual
doctrine is used), should have yielded, for example, some relief in the
case of Leo White. Without solely relying on White’s race, but at the
same time without ignoring it in a colorblind fashion, the court could
have recognized White’s vulnerability. In fact, such vulnerability was
indeed expressly acknowledged by the court, which described White
as a “vulnerable, low-income, unsophisticated, first-time home buyer,” in addition to being African-American. Other parts of the decision detail White’s limited education, his young age, his need to support his family, his occupation as a hotel bellman who earns only
$2100 a month, and so on. And yet, without proof of the intent to discriminate against White based on his race, the court doubted that
legal meaning could be assigned to the above details. In contrast, under a contractual regime that forbids exploitation of vulnerability,
those circumstances would be highly significant to any effort to evaluate White’s vulnerability. Other circumstances should be taken into
account as marking the exploitation of such vulnerability, even if the
theory of intentional discrimination is rejected. Even if the lenders
were not motivated by racial concerns, they were surely abusing
White’s depleted resources by convincing him to use their appraisal
service, inflating the appraisal of the purchased property, exaggerating the income he could get from renting out parts of the house, and
making hollow promises regarding the value-enhancing repairs.

185. That is, to the extent that courts are willing to employ these protective doctrines.
See, e.g., Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 175, 184 (2009) (“Modern contract law precluded the policing doctrines from
protecting the victims of contractual coercion.”).
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Moreover, even if Whites’s racial identity cannot in and of itself
justify judicial relief, the racial aspects of his vulnerability are not
meaningless. Race and segregation have been playing a major role in
the story of distressed neighborhoods. They can limit residents’ ability to escape stress by leaving their neighborhood for a better one. A
comment in the court’s decision in White’s matter reflects some
awareness of that reality: “It is no accident that Better Homes was
not selling real estate on Park Avenue or Central Park West.”186 In
fact, Leo’s loan related to a building in 164 Macon St. Brooklyn,
which is part of a zip code that is populated by 89.9% minorities: 79%
African-Americans and 10.9% Hispanic.187 Furthermore, 90% of the
loans made by the lenders in White’s case were made to AfricanAmericans in distressed neighborhoods.188 As a result, the racial dimension ought not to disappear and the review cannot be colorblind.
Rather, race should be taken into account as one of many factors that
created Leo’s vulnerability and subsequent exploitation.
Overall, after reading the case and supplementing it with basic
information regarding Leo’s address, we know that Leo White was a
resident of one of the distressed neighborhoods of our country.189 We
also know that not only was he black, but he was also very young,
uneducated, poor, inexperienced, and pressured by the need to take
care of his family. Although the court doubted that intentional racebased discrimination occurred, it should be easier to prove that the
lenders exploited Leo’s vulnerability. We know that the lenders used
sharp techniques to make it difficult to evaluate the economic meaning of the loan’s terms, such as telling Leo that part of the payments
could be funded by finding paying tenants who would probably rent
part of the property and allow him to repay the loan. We also know
that the agreement’s terms, all dictated one-sidedly by the lenders,
were unreasonably harsh and were seemingly based on a grossly inflated appraisal of the value of the property. Leo White, I suggest,
was vulnerable and his vulnerability was exploited. Although I think
it all had much to do with him being a poor African-American man
trying to function in a capitalist world dominated by elites, I believe
there is an alternative legal way to analyze the situation. This way
does not ignore race. It is not colorblind. It does, however, put race in
a richer and more nuanced context with the aim of finding a path to
possible relief for vulnerable populations, within the means of al-

186.
187.
188.
189.

M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d 538, 576 (2010).
11216 Zip Code, http://zipcode.org/11216 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
White, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
See supra Part II.
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ready existing legal doctrines, especially after finding antidiscrimination claims are no longer viable.
B. Utilizing the Unconscionability Doctrine
Among the possible contractual doctrines (defenses) that can be
used to take neighborhood stress into account, and more broadly legally restrain the exploitation of vulnerability, I would like to highlight here the potential of the unconscionability doctrine.190 I focus on
unconscionability for three main reasons. First, it is the broadest doctrine out of the four relevant ones, whereas each of the other three
has a more specific focus (threat for duress, fraud for misrepresentation, and abuse of dependency for undue influence). Second, there is
more uniformity among jurisdictions regarding the tests and elements of unconscionability, and thus the model suggested here can be
more easily applied in different states. Third, as opposed to undue
influence, unconscionability applies more readily to the commercial
setting in which predatory loans belong. Additionally, I believe that
at its core, economic exploitation is an issue of conscience and a
transgression of morals on the part of the exploiters191 an issue that
is explicitly addressed by a doctrine whose name is “unconscionability” with its roots in the “courts of conscience.”192
190. Note, however, that stress sensitive courts have unsystematically used a variety
of those doctrines to analyze consent that was given under distress and to award relief
when consent was impaired. See Keren, supra note 30.
191. It is important to note that another valuable doctrine that relates to morality
might be the doctrine of good faith. Although not understood as a contractual defense, good
faith similar to unconscionability enjoys a broad scope and direct link to issues of
morality. Unfortunately, however, the current condition of the good faith doctrine is
making it a less pragmatic solution to the problem at hand, mainly due to the general
weakness of the idea in Anglo American legal systems. A specific difficulty in applying a
good faith analysis to predatory loan agreements is that such analysis requires extending
the doctrine to the pre contractual phase, where there is even less consensus regarding its
applicability. That being said, I strongly believe that courts could and should use the
standard of good faith more frequently. I also believe that exploitation of vulnerability via
contracts, such as the use of predatory loan agreements, is outright bad faith behavior that
should be treated as a breach of the duty of good faith. For a suggestion to use good faith in
the context of the subprime crisis, see Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the
Case for Broadening the Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 621 (2011). For a suggestion
to use good faith in the context of pre contractual discrimination to bypass problems
related to anti discrimination laws, see Hila Keren, “We Insist! Freedom Now”: Does
Contract Doctrine Have Anything Constitutional To Say?, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 171
72 (2005).
192. See, e.g., Dennis R. Klinck, The Nebulous Equitable Duty of Conscience, 31
QUEEN’S L.J. 206, 208 n.9 (2005) (“The courts of equity in England are, and always have
been, courts of conscience.” (citing Ewing v. Orr Ewing, (1883) 9 App. Cas. 34, 40)); see also
id. at 211 (“[N]o doubt historically conscience and equity were intimately allied, even syn
onymous.”); Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 73, 76 90 (2006) (describing the history of the unconscionability doctrine as rooted
in ideas of equity and fairness).
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How would the idea of unconscionability work in the context of
predatory loan agreements? Although it might vary, most jurisdictions divide the discussion of unconscionability into two aspects, or
two “prongs:” the procedural, and the substantive.193 The procedural
prong of unconscionability relates to the process of making the contract. Under this, courts should review the individual vulnerability of
the borrower to determine whether they were able to make a meaningful choice under the circumstances, especially given the cognitive
difficulties imposed by chronic stress. The court should also review
the lender’s behavior prior to the finalization of the loan agreement (I
deliberately do not use the word “negotiation” as there is usually
none in the process of finalizing predatory loan agreements),194 and
check how exploitive the lender was in dealing with the vulnerable
borrower. Here, targeting efforts, as well as every nondisclosure, hollow promise, inflated income or value, and tempting (too-good-to-betrue) entry rate—to name a few common tactics used by lenders—
should be taken into account. These are all manipulative techniques
used to exploit the borrowers’ vulnerability by intentionally reducing
their ability to evaluate the quality of the offered transaction. Note
that under such review, whether or not these manipulations were
motivated by discriminatory beliefs or intentions matters less than
the fact that they were used to take advantage of the borrower’s isolation, limited financial means, and relative weakness. Evidence, for
example, that the lenders reassured Leo White that he would be able
to pay his loan despite his low income because he would have three
tenants paying $1200 each per month, while in fact he could only legally have two tenants at any one time, could be one concrete way of
satisfying the procedural prong.
Under the substantive prong of unconscionability, courts review
the contract’s specific terms and the overall fairness of the transaction. Courts should search for all the signs of predatory lending that
mark the agreement as unfair and render the terms of the loan significantly worse than other loans available to less vulnerable borrowers. For that purpose, post-crisis literature can supply very clear, albeit disheartening, lists of “creative” terms that were in use during
193. Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism The Sliding
Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1, 6 (2012) (offering a detailed
description of the procedural and substantial prongs and their interaction under the case
law of different jurisdictions).
194. Leo White, for example, testified that there was no negotiation of the terms of the
loan agreement. M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d 538, 546 (2010) (“White was
not represented by an attorney when he signed the contract of sale, and does not remember
speaking with or consulting anyone about its terms prior to signing. He did not object to
any of the contract terms, and testified that he had read through and understood the
document.”)
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the subprime crisis. As the government investigates and settles with
more lenders, these lists, and others to come, can assist judges in
recognizing and evaluating the concrete unfairness of the agreement
and assess the need for relief. This list includes a very low or zero
down payment accompanied by a very high loan-to-value (LTV) ratio,
payment increases which start as teaser rates for the first few years,
a first period of “interest only” or “below interest” rates followed by
steeply escalating and changing (“adjusting”) rate, prepayment penalties, and a long list of origination and post-origination fees.195
Therefore, I suggest applying existent tools of contract law to the
contractual issue of predatory loan agreements as an alternative to
the reverse redlining cause of action. This alternative need not be
restricted to borrowers in distressed neighborhoods,196 but could be
particularly valuable when coping with an argument that at its core
relies on intentional targeting by stronger lenders. Cases of borrowers who couldn’t prove race-based discrimination fall right within the
conventional analysis of unconscionability, with abundant evidence of
both procedural and substantive unconscionability to justify relief.
As a matter of fact, there is indistinguishable litigation against
the same lenders who exploited White, which can demonstrate the
effectiveness of utilizing the unconscionability doctrine. In that case,
the borrowers, Cedric and Elizabeth Miller, an African-American
couple from another distressed neighborhood in Brooklyn, argued for
relief using the unconscionability doctrine.197 Rejecting a motion to
dismiss by the lenders, the court explained how the Millers’ unconscionability argument may be successful if the necessary facts could
be proven at trial. Dividing the analysis into the customary twoprong test, the court decided that both appeared to be satisfied. In
regards to procedural unconscionability, the court said:
A contract is procedurally unconscionable where the contract formation process is tainted by fraud or misrepresentation . . . and
can be demonstrated through a showing of, among other things,
“high pressure commercial tactics, inequality of bargaining power,
deceptive practices and language in the contract, and an imbalance
in the understanding and acumen of the parties.” Here, Private
Defendants actively sought out buyers like the Millers who lacked
business experience and then effectively prevented the Millers
195. OREN BAR GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
CONSUMER MARKETS 135 45 (2012) (offering a data based description of the typical
subprime contracts).
196. I elaborate elsewhere on the idea of using contractual doctrines such as
unconscionabilty to release other distressed victims of exploitation, in other contexts, such
as release agreements made upon termination of employment relationships or last minute
pre nuptial agreements. Keren, supra note 30.
197. M & T Mortg. Corp. v. Miller, 323 F. Supp. 2d 405, 412 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).

358

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:313

from avoiding harm through the use of competent counsel or an
independent lender.198

Next, moving on to the prong of substantive unconscionability, the
court added that lenders’ artificial inflation of the purchased home’s
value could satisfy the requirement.199 Then, concluding the twoprong analysis, the court emphasized how appropriate it is to employ
the unconscionability doctrine in this context. It explained that
“[w]hile a contract is not rendered unconscionable merely because
one party made a poor business decision, where, as here, that decision was induced through fraud that effectively limited, if not eliminated, the aggrieved parties’ ability to make an informed decision, a
claim of unconscionability is proper.200
Although the court did not take into account the effect of life in a
distressed neighborhood, as suggested above, the Millers’ case
demonstrates that the use of the unconscionability doctrine in the
predatory lending context flows naturally and might work well, especially when lenders have exploited the borrowers’ impaired decisionmaking capabilities. Despite the fact that some other courts have refused to find potential unconscionability in reverse redlining scenarios,201 the path undeniably exists.202 The coming section further discusses the advantages of utilizing unconscionability and considers
possible objections.
C. Evaluating the Suggested Framework
1. Advantages
First and foremost, utilizing contract law and its existing doctrines to invalidate the contractual exploitation of vulnerability is
both a natural and feasible legal response and can be instantaneously applied.203 As such, it would efficiently establish an explicit norm,
198. Id. at 413 (internal citations omitted).
199. Id. (“A contract is substantively unconscionable where its terms are unreasonably
favorable to the party against whom unconscionability is claimed. Here, the Millers paid a
sales price that represented a 60% premium over [the] purchase price, which [the lenders]
knew (as demonstrated by their misrepresentations in the mortgage insurance application)
the Millers could not afford and which the Millers immediately defaulted on.” (internal
citation omitted)).
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. See, e.g., Levey v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 07 C 2678, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70210
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2009).
202. See Frank Lopez, Note, Using the Fair Housing Act to Combat Predatory Lending,
6 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 73, 86 88 (1999) (recognizing the possibility of using
unconscionability in this context but criticizing this path).
203. See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code The Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 537 (1967) (explaining the emergence of the doctrine as a
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with expressive powers, against such market behavior.204 Once clearly established it can have a significant impact: many would simply
obey the law for moral and/or economic reasons and the explicit existence of a legal norm would further support the already existing
social norm against such behavior.205
Furthermore, the proposed alternative offers protection without
classification. As opposed to the reverse redlining cause of action, the
contractual analysis does not rely on race-based categories and thus
does not trigger the tension between the requested judicial intervention and the growing anti-classification tendencies discussed earlier.
Indeed, “[u]nconscionability is an open-ended, undefined concept subject to judicial definition case-by-case.”206 By its own definition the
standard of unconscionability never depends on one factor. To the
contrary, it “[t]ypically . . . results from a complex, variable set of
grounds for relief, which causes the court to make a judgment in
sum.”207 In this “sum,” race is at least one factor out of many, if not “a
factor of a factor of a factor” to use the now-famous language used by
the Supreme Court in Fisher.208 For example, through the lenses of
response to overreaching market behavior against vulnerable owners of land: “It is out of
these special attributes of land, making up the Gestalt of real property (as opposed to the
‘goods’ of the Code), that there arise those repeated dramatic vignettes with which the
Chancellors were continually faced the abused old and unsophisticated young, the slicker
and the farmer, the money lender and the expectant heir. This cast of characters, to a large
extent determined by the nature of the commodity, led to the various forms of overreaching
which, while not quite adding up to fraud or duress, formed the pictures of bargaining pro
cesses which the chancellors declared ‘unconscionable.’ ”). For a suggestion to use the doc
trine of unconscionability to protect property rights of African Americans, see McFarlane,
supra note 47, at 917 (“Another place from which to construct or assemble a more open
recognition of the implied right to keep should be through contract’s unconscionability doc
trine.”).
204. Compare this perspective to the European ban of contractual exploitation. For
example, Article 51 of the European Commission’s Proposal for a Common European Sales
Law focuses on “unfair exploitation.” The article reads as follows: “A party may avoid a
contract if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract: (a) that party was dependent on, or
had a relationship of trust with, the other party, was in economic distress or had urgent
needs, was improvident, ignorant, or inexperienced; and (b) the other party knew or could
be expected to have known this and, in the light of the circumstances and purpose of the
contract, exploited the first party’s situation by taking an excessive benefit or unfair ad
vantage.” Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Common European Sales Law, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 52 (Nov. 10, 2011), http://eur
lex.europa.eu/legal content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011PC0635.
205. LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 21
(2011) (arguing that most people will obey “instructions from authority”).
206. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194 (2004).
207. 1 10 Virginia Remedies § 10.11 (2012).
208. Compare the two variations in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013). According to Justice Kennedy, “[t]he University of Texas at Austin considers
race as one of various factors in its undergraduate admissions process.” Id. at 2415 (em
phasis added). Justice Ginsburg chose to cite the lower court’s famous expression:
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unconscionability a middle class African-American borrower who
used the loan to buy a home in an upscale neighborhood may not deserve relief while a poor white resident of a distressed neighborhood
may deserve it.
In fact, a move towards drawing on contract law as an alternative
to the anti-discrimination paradigm mirrors recent shifts in the jurisprudence of the Equal Protection Clause, shifts that not only break
away from classification, as described earlier, but also include an
emergence of alternative solutions. Indeed, the injustice of predatory
loans is not sustainable, and when the classification door is shut, another door must open. Scholars writing in the constitutional arena
have suggested different descriptions and names to such progression.
Instead of the dichotomous split between the anti-classification
and anti-subordination voices at the Supreme Court (with the former
having the upper hand), Professor Reva Siegel has identified a third
approach. She named it “the anti-balkanization perspective,” a name
that alludes to the fact that, for some, the resistance to classification
comes from a fear of social balkanization.209 Siegel’s antibalkanization lies in the space between disregarding racial issues
(nothing is about race) and emphasizing them (everything is about
race). This approach, carved by “centrist” Supreme Court judges, aspires to help these populations and yet still resists treating people
based on racial classifications. However, these judges do not resist
taking race into account as part of a broader quest for diversity,
where race is only one factor among others and is used to fully understand the effect of a segregated past and present.
Anti-balkanization judges, who allow carefully-tailored classifications but resist general classifications, would probably feel better
taking race into account in a contextual manner, as one out of many
factors rather than as an independent source of relief. Consequently,
even anti-classification judges, who usually find it difficult to award
relief based on race (or other identity-based classifications), may feel
comfortable applying a contractual doctrine to a variety of facts that
have established a concrete and unique vulnerability.
Like the anti-balkanization approach, the suggested contractual
alternative does not advocate for, or require, colorblindness. Since
race is a major individual stressor for minorities of all walks of life,
no comprehensive legal response should try to deny its place in understanding the impact of distressed neighborhoods on their resi“[UT] . . . considers race only as a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor . . . .” Id. at 2434
(citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (em
phasis added)).
209. Siegel, supra note 22, at 1283.
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dents’ wellbeing. Rather, one of the advantages of applying unconscionability, in this context, is the distinction and space it offers between anti-classification and colorblindness.
Although contributors to the constitutional discourse sometimes
use the terms anti-classification and colorblindness interchangeably,
anti-classification does not and should not mean colorblindness. The
case of Illinois v. Wardlow demonstrates how judges’ analyses can
refrain from colorblindness and still adhere to anti-classification by
utilizing the space between the two.210 Although written in the criminal context, the case navigates relevant issues of race and distressed
neighborhoods. The Supreme Court reviewed the forcible stop-andfrisk of Mr. Wardlow, who ran when he noticed the police. Justice
Rehnquist wrote an analysis that confirmed the legality of the stop
and omitted Mr. Wardlow’s race, despite an amicus brief submitted
by the NAACP that defined him as “a middle-aged African-American
male.”211 Taking the colorblindness approach, the Court decided in an
abstract way that “[h]eadlong flight–wherever it occurs” justified
“suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity.”212 The
Court explained that inferring guilt from an unprovoked flight is
“based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”213 Dissenting—and demonstrating the ability to avoid both
colorblindness and classification—Justice Stevens resisted the generalization. Instead, he insisted that Warldlow’s “human behavior”
must be contextualized and the analysis should take into account
both his neighborhood’s conditions and his race. Without classifying
but without ignoring the reality, Justice Stevens explained that
“[a]mong some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in
high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person
is entirely innocent, but[] . . . believes that contact with the police can
itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with
the officer’s sudden presence.”214 Similar to Justice Stevens’ approach, applying an unconscionability analysis to reverse redlining
210. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
211. Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 452 (2012).
212. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 25.
213. Id. at 125.
214. Id. at 132 (emphasis added). As opposed to the majority, Justice Stevens had
relied on more than “common sense” in describing the impact of race. In a footnote attached
to the sentence quoted above he referenced studies and reports that offer a fuller and more
empirical description of the context. This method can be adopted in applying
unconscionability analysis to exploitations of vulnerability. Responding to the majority’s
suggestion that the high crime area makes the fleet more suspicious he concluded that,
“because many factors providing innocent motivations for unprovoked flight are
concentrated in high crime areas, the character of the neighborhood arguably makes an
inference of guilt less appropriate, rather than more so.” Id. at 139.
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cases can offer judges the freedom to take an “anti-balkanization”
path. Judges can refrain from both classification and colorblindness
by examining race as a factor in a nuanced and thoughtful way. Aiming understanding a concrete situation rather than establishing an
overarching conclusion regarding intentional discrimination, the
court can help borrowers on a contextual basis.
Professor Yoshino’s “new equal protection” offers an alternative
way to analyze the meaning of current anti-classification trends.
Similar to Siegel’s anti-balkanization, it suggests that anticlassification does not necessarily mean colorblindness.215 The phrase
“New Equal Protection” captures an emerging judicial approach that
still cares about equality, but is reluctant to use group-based legal
tools to achieve it. Influenced by the work of Professor Tribe,216
Yoshino suggests that the Supreme Court’s new emphasis on human
dignity is the way in which it increasingly avoid classifications, while
still vindicating equality concerns. He argues that since issues of inequality have not disappeared, “the Court has shut doors in its equality jurisprudence in the name of pluralism anxiety and opened doors
in its liberty jurisprudence to compensate.”217 Under this analysis, the
main doors in the Court’s liberty jurisprudence are based on dignity
claims.
A leading example is the decision in Lawrence v. Texas,218 where
the Court refused to take the classification path and add sexual orientation to the list of protected categories. Nonetheless, the Court
still found a way to support gay people, who were the main victims of
sodomy statutes, in their quest for equality. Although the challenged
sodomy statute in this case was sex-specific, prohibiting same-sex,
but not different-sex sodomy,219 the Lawrence Court struck it down on
liberal grounds. It did so by broadly acknowledging “the fundamental
right of all persons — straight, gay, or otherwise — to control their
intimate sexual relations.”220
The judicial approach formulated in Lawrence promotes equality
as part of a universal right to dignity, shared by all human beings
215. Yoshino, supra note 23, at 748 50.
216. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897 98 (2004).
217. Yoshino, supra note 23, at 750. Importantly, at least in the employment context,
legislators also reacted to the Court’s refusal to recognize sexual orientation as a protected
class. See Note, The Benefits of Unequal Protection, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1357 (2013)
(“[A]t least nineteen states plus the District of Columbia have already passed legislation
that[] . . . prohibits employment discrimination . . . based on sexual orientation.”).
218. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
219. Yoshino, supra note 23, at 777.
220. Id.
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regardless of group-identities. In an anti-classification age, to conceptualize equality in such a manner has the advantage of being facially
neutral. Therefore, the focus on dignity as an organizing concept allows judges to take equality concerns into account, without harming
the social cohesion they feel is threatened by classification.221
In the same vein, treating the exploitation of vulnerability as unconscionable market behavior can fit the profile of a dignity claim.
Like the right to control our intimate life, we all should have a right
to not be exploited by others when we are vulnerable. Exploitation of
vulnerability in the market not only causes devastating economic
damage, it also harms dignity. It shames the vulnerable party, leaving him helpless and looking pathetic and unable to take care of his
own matters. Therefore, the accumulative consequences of exploitation pose a direct threat to human dignity and courts should be allowed and even encouraged to intervene.222 Of course, dignity and
equality are intertwined, and group-based protection is not really extinct.223 As Yoshino reminds us, “[i]n finding all thirteen sodomy statutes unconstitutional, Lawrence clearly helped gay people more than
it helped straight people.”224 This point is pertinent in our context as
well, because establishing a norm against exploitation of vulnerability in the market would clearly assist weaker market players of disenfranchised groups more than their stronger counterparts. In that
sense, predatory loan agreements cannot–and should not–be divorced
from their socio-economic context. Indeed, as Siegel points out, working in the space between colorblindness and classification “entails
practical, contextual judgments attentive to the concerns of differently situated members of the polity.”225

221. Siegel, supra note 22, at 1308 (describing the judicial preference of Justice
Kennedy to vindicate “equal protection in ways that promote social cohesion a sense of
attachment shared by all in the community . . . .”).
222. Martijn W. Hesselink, Unconscionability, Unfair Exploitation and the Nature of
Contract Theory: Comments on Melvin Eisenberg’s “Foundational Principles of Contract
Law” 2 (Ctr. for the Study of European Contract Law, Working Paper No. 2013 03), availa
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209752 (“[A]s free and equal citizens we owe respect to
each other’s dignity, and that it is not right for the state to lend its power for the
enforcement of bargains that are so disproportionate that they become exploitative and
therefore disrespectful of the other party’s human dignity.”).
223. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 n.2 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (“The notion that Texas’ Top Ten Percent Law is race neutral calls to mind
Professor Thomas Reed Powell’s famous statement: ‘If you think that you can think about a
thing inextricably attached to something else without thinking of the thing which it is
attached to, then you have a legal mind.’ Only that kind of legal mind could conclude that
an admissions plan specifically designed to produce racial diversity is not race conscious.”
(internal citation omitted)).
224. See Yoshino, supra note 23, at 778 79.
225. See Siegel, supra note 22, at 1308.
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The vulnerability theory calls upon the state to be more responsive,
and therefore serves as additional theoretical support for utilizing unconscionability where reverse redlining has failed. Accordingly, as a
measure of help to vulnerable subjects, this theory underscores the
state’s deep commitment to a proactive countering of inequalities instead of a minimalistic engagement in keeping formal equality intact.
Such an expectation reflects a giant step beyond what is allowed under
the private/public dichotomy, where private loans are marginally scrutinized by the public legal system. Further, it echoes a belief, shared by
many (albeit not all), that contract law—despite its “private” image—
has a meaningful public role to play in the social arena and “is a mode
of social regulation whose rules ought to serve social goals.”226
Furthermore, the use of an extensive contractual doctrine, like
unconscionability, is strategically advantageous in the context of economic exploitation. Using specific legislation to forbid particular
kinds of abuse, such as the ban on notorious pay-day loans, does not
defend against greedy market players who will simply identify loopholes and find ways to continue to profit from exploiting others’ vulnerability, such as lending via the internet to avoid state regulations.227 At least one state has explained the special value of the unconscionability doctrine as a “blanket rule,” stating, “[t]he legislative
process is too slow to keep up with market practices, so the courts
must have power to monitor the market for the protection of all participants.”228 Although the law cannot totally stop people from trying
to make more profits by taking advantage of others, it can make it
harder for them to succeed and discourage them from further attempts. This goal can be achieved by utilizing the concept of unconscionability to send a clear and general message, that any form of
226. Roy Kreitner, Fault at the Contract Tort Interface, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1533, 1549
(2009); see also Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1, 45 47 (2011) (arguing that contract law is indeed public law).
227. Leah A. Plunkett & Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small Dollar Loans, Big Problems: How
States Protect Consumers from Abuses and How the Federal Government Can Help, 44
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31, 38 (2011); see also William M. Woodyard & Chad G. Marzen, Is
Greed Good? A Catholic Perspective on Modern Usury, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 185, 216
(describing a “Texas loophole that allows title loan lenders to be classified as a ‘credit
service organization’ rather than as a lender[]” and explaining that such “loophole allows
Texas title loan ‘credit service organizations’ to charge triple digit interest rates”).
228. 1 10 Virginia Remedies § 10.11 (2012); see also David Ray Papke, Perpetuating
Poverty: Exploitative Businesses, the Urban Poor, and the Failure of Reform, 16 SCHOLAR
223, 225 (2014) (“The business models and concomitant contractual agreements of rent to
own outlets, payday lenders, and title pawns are so sophisticated and adjustable as to
make them virtually impervious to regulation. As a result, rent to own outlets, payday lend
ers, and title pawns continue not only to exploit the urban poor, but also to socioeconomically
subjugate the urban poor by trapping them into a ceaseless debt cycle. A blanket proscription
of these tawdry businesses might be the only way to drive them from our midst and to elimi
nate their active role in the perpetuation of urban poverty.” (emphases added)).
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exploitation is forbidden regardless of the concrete method used. At
least one court that had dismissed a reverse redlining argument but
allowed an unconscionability argument to proceed referred to this
“residual” or “catch-all” attribute of the doctrine, explaining that “[i]t
also seems to the court that the purpose of the unconscionability doctrine, in providing protection to vulnerable, unsophisticated parties,
is to plug the gaps left open by applicable statutory provisions when
they do not afford consumers adequate protections.”229 This is the
known advantage of broad standards like good faith and unconscionability over specific rules: it is much harder to escape their coverage.230 A clear and general message against exploitation will support
and strengthen social and moral norms that disapprove of such behavior, which can encourage stronger market players to exercise
more self-restraint.
Moreover, in the context of predatory loan agreements, proving
neighborhood-related vulnerability may be easier than trying to
prove discrimination. In some cases it is possible that the failure to
prove intentional race-based discrimination had less to do with the
judicial discomfort with classifications and more to do with the fact
that discrimination was not the lenders’ leading motivation. Some
lenders may have been indifferent to questions of race and were
equally interested in all the residents of such distressed areas because of their tendency to have a high need for loans and low ability
to cope with lenders’ unscrupulous schemes. If the practice of predatory lending is more attributable to greed, which fosters ruthless
business ethics, than to a “taste” against minorities, it is of little surprise that it is difficult to prove racial discrimination.
This is so not because race is irrelevant, as argued by colorblind
approach, or no longer relevant, as suggested by post-racialists. This
is because race only partially overlaps with the story of predatory
loans sold to residents of previously redlined neighborhoods. Many
lenders who focused on potential subprime borrowers ignored affluent suburban areas and concentrated on those residing in distressed
areas, including the admittedly few white dwellers. These cases identify that it is exactly people’s aggregate vulnerability that attracts
the exploitation, because it suggests that extra profit may be made by
capitalizing on others’ desperation and lack of alternatives. The fact
that residents of distressed neighborhoods are overwhelmingly African-Americans is relevant, because race is recognized as an independent stressor which adds to vulnerability and impairs resilience.
229. Ng v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., No. 07 CV 5434 (RRM)(VVP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125711, at *63 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009) (emphasis added).
230. For the differences between standards and rules in general, see Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
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Yet, according to this perspective, the lenders themselves are not
necessarily driven by discriminatory preferences. They are “merely”
exploiting the effects of years of “distributive injustice”231 and discrimination by others. After all, “[e]xploiters are typically opportunists; they extract advantage from situations that are not of their own
making.”232
Even when the intent to discriminate exists, it is typically difficult
to prove. Therefore, although these cases have a clear discriminatory
effect, because the lenders are possibly motivated by other reasons, it
might be even harder to prove the intent to discriminate. Thus, it
might be easier to show evidence that borrowers were targeted based
on their residence in “the wrong zip code,”233 or neighborhood. To
prove people residing in a specific area were targeted, tempting ads
in a local newspaper can serve as evidence, even if some can doubt
that using images of minorities in those ads proves an intention to
discriminate them based on their race.234
A final point of practical salience is the remedial flexibility provided by unconscionability as a contractual cause of action. While courts
can refuse to enforce the entire loan agreement, they are also authorized to take a more nuanced and contextual step, and to “so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.”235 In short, courts can use unconscionability to “undo”

231. Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 135 36
(2008) (“While the doctrine of unconscionability is not explicitly framed in distributive
terms, its distributive aspects have been often noted. . . . [C]ourts usually do not apply the
doctrine to the benefit of rich victims.”).
232. JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, 4 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 177, 183 84 (1988) (emphasis added); see also ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 39 40
(1987) (offering a contrast between causing the one’s lack of options and taking advantage
of such lack of options and suggesting that the doctrine of unconscionability is the one that
fits the latter category).
233. JONES, supra note 95, at 12.
234. The Federal Trade Commission has published a guide to help consumer recognize
such ads. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DECEPTIVE MORTGAGE ADS (2012), available at
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0087 deceptive mortgage ads. Publications of this sort
assist lawyers in proving and judges and juries in finding unconscionability.
235. Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About
How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97
MARQ. L. REV. 751, 756, 764 69, 781 92 (2014) (quotation omitted) (citing legislated ver
sions of the doctrine as follows: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15(A); see also ALASKA
STAT. § 45.02.302(A); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4 2 302(1); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4 2 302(1); 810 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2 302(1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2 302(1); MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW § 2 02(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2 302(1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75 2 302(1); MO.
ANN. STAT. §400.2 302(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30 2 302(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2 302(1); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.2302(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382 A:2 302(1); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 55 2 302(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25 2 302(1); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020(1); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6A 2 302(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36 2 302(1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2 302(1)).

2015]

LAW AND ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION

367

the extra-profit made by exploitation without invalidating the entire
economic process.
2. Possible Objections
The main predicted criticism of using contract law, and the defense of unconscionability in particular, is based on thirty years of
criticism of the unconscionability doctrine and the seminal decision
in Williams v. Walker-Thomas.236 Following law and economics commentators, such as Richard Posner and Richard Epstein, it can be argued that a responsive state does little good to vulnerable subjects if it
gives them relief due to their condition since such relief will cause
lenders to refrain from lending money to vulnerable people due to the
risk that their loan agreements would be rendered unenforceable.237
Robin West has recently paraphrased the conclusion of such antiintervention critiques as follows: “[i]f you want to help poor and uneducated buyers, for heaven’s sake, hold them to their contracts.”238
There are, however, several important responses to this conventional anti-intervention line of reasoning. At the most basic level it
should be clear that decades after the prediction was made, no one
has proved, or even tried to prove, the apocalyptic hypothesis that
lies at the core of the critique. In other words, there is no evidence,
despite years of experience, that knowing that the court may protect
people from exploitation will cause exploiters to cease their engagement with the protected parties (and people similar to them). While
the prospect of protection may deter some market players from contracting with the “protected,” in other cases it may not. It is at least
as probable that the prospect of legal relief will incentivize market
players to behave more reasonably even if only in order to selfishly
avoid the invalidation of their contracts and costs of litigation.
In fact, many transactions are made despite continuing and sometimes growing legal measures taken against exploitation of vulnerability. For example, employees continue to initiate consensual separation agreements as an alternative to one-sided termination of the
employment relationship even after courts have awarded relief to
employees who were pressured into signing release agreements.239
236. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
237. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) (Judge
Posner stating: “It is a detriment, not a benefit, to one’s long run interests not to be able to
make a binding commitment.”); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical
Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 306 08 (1975).
238. Robin West, The Anti Empathic Turn, in PASSIONS & EMOTIONS 243, 258 (James
Fleming ed., 2013).
239. See, e.g., Meyers v. Trugreen, Inc., No. 03 C 7570, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9200, at
*12 13, 17 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2004) (invalidating employee’s consent to release her employer
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Similarly, businesses have not stopped selling computers using electronic methods even after some courts released buyers from unfair
terms hidden in the contracts that were put into the boxes of those
computers.240 Or, as one commentator writing in the context of predatory prenuptial agreements noted: “[t]he potential husband might be
interested in marrying even if the terms of his proposed premarital
agreement must be made more fair.”241
In fact, much support can be found for the opposite hypothesis,
that judicial protection can reduce exploitation by both clarifying that
it is not an acceptable market behavior and demanding it be replaced
by more pro-social behavior. There are experimental and real-life examples that strongly suggest that many people would respond to an
authoritative order to behave morally and pro-socially by obeying the
order rather than by acting selfishly. In one experiment, for example,
one group of players in a social dilemma game that involved money
transfers was told that it is going to play the “Community Game,”
while the other was told that the game is called the “Wall Street
game.”242 Even though the contrasting names given to the game carried a somewhat implicit message, far weaker than a clear order from
an authority, the groups played the otherwise identical game with
significant differences.243 Players of the so-called community game
demonstrated much less selfish decisions than those who played the
so-called Wall Street game.244 Applied to the legal context, since
courts and judges are certainly respected sources of authority in our
society, more exploiters are likely to stop or at least restrain their
selfish efforts if told to do so. What was noted with regard to good
faith can be applied with similar force to unconscionability:
“[c]ontract law serves a type of expressive function by communicating
to tradesmen that certain standards of decency will be required of
their conduct.”245
Perhaps most importantly, the risk that protecting a weaker
group will eventually harm the members of the group is not relevant,
based the fact that the latter took advantage of the employee’s heightened vulnerability at
the end of her employment with same employer).
240. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 75 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998) (using unconscionability to release consumer from an unfair arbitration term that
was in included in a contract that was put in the box of a delivered computer).
241. Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 251,
260 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010).
242. STOUT, supra note 205, at 105.
243. Id.
244. Id. (“[P]eople change their behavior in social dilemmas in response to mere hints
about what the experimenter desires.”).
245. Erin Ann O’Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract, in MORAL MARKETS: THE
CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 173, 186 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
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or at least significantly less relevant, outside the anti-discrimination
framework. When protection is awarded without relying on group
identity, but rather on contextual and individual considerations, exploiters cannot predict whom they should avoid. This is exactly why
using the doctrine of unconscionability as a defense can solve the
problems that emerge while trying to utilize the anti-discrimination
norm of reverse redlining. In order to escape judicial scrutiny in their
transactions, some market players may prefer not to deal with an
identified group of people,246 however it is much harder to systematically avoid parties who are under stress, even if they reside in certain
zip codes. This conclusion arises from the fact that stress, as discussed earlier, is universal and can hit anyone anywhere.247 Put
simply, unless lenders are willing to give up their subprime lending
activity entirely, they cannot crudely cross-out people who reside in
distressed areas and suffer from stress. Since the proposed judicial
protection on the basis of stress is drawing on a beyond-identity
analysis248 and is carefully calibrated to context, it can encounter exploitation without risking the ability of any particular group to create
binding contracts. In this context, it is also worth remembering that
unconscionability-based relief depends not only on the vulnerability of
the borrower, but also on the specific behavior of the lender and the
degree to which the terms of the contract are predatory. Therefore, rather than abandon their business altogether, it is feasible that lenders
will prefer to decrease the chances of legal intervention in their business by modifying elements that are under their full control: their own
pre-contractual behavior and their own choice in terms.
Finally, we should all remember that an anti-interventionist response, of the kind considered here, is a political approach that can
be questioned and indeed has been heavily criticized. From scholars
who directly criticize the liberal “extremely individualistic and privatized” assumption and call for proactive repair of socioeconomic
injustices,249 to those who are usually more willing to show deference

246. I have argued elsewhere that such preference is discriminatory and that contract
law, in addition to other laws, should ban it. See Keren, supra note 191, at 171 72
(explaining why and how contract law has an essential role to play in the context of
discrimination even when anti discrimination laws are available and may apply).
247. In making this argument I am drawing again on Martha Fineman’s compelling
vulnerability theory with its insistence on beyond identity analysis. See Fineman, The
Responsive State, supra note 33, at 266 69.
248. See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 33, at 17 (referring to “post
identity paradigm”). Since I do not agree that the identity based problems are part of the past
I prefer using the term “beyond identity” rather than the original “post identity” phrase.
249. See, e.g., Martha A. Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1747 (2012) (arguing
against the neoliberal paradigm which is centered around “liberal subjects” and a
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to the market and accordingly propose to “nudge” instead of interfering,250 many agree that the market simply cannot fix systemic inequalities. As Cass Sunstein has recently stated:
In free markets, some sellers attempt to exploit human errors, and
the forces of competition may turn out to reward, rather than punish, such exploitation. In identifiable cases, those who do not exploit human errors will be seriously punished by market forces,
simply because their competitors are doing so and profiting as a
result. Credit markets provide many examples in the domains of
cell phones, credit cards, and mortgages.251

And so, even if some commentators frame predatory lending as either
“efficient,” and thus worth keeping, or “inefficient,” and therefore
about to disappear without costly intervention, numerous others—
holding a range of political viewpoints—disagree.
Notably, Professor Eisenberg reminds us that the particular intervention proposed here—via the doctrine of unconscionability—is a
very mild form of intervention, the minimum the state owes its citizens: “[u]nder that doctrine the government forbids nothing and
commands nothing. It simply says to the promisee, ‘If you can accomplish your ends without our assistance, fine. But don’t ask us to help
you recover a pound of flesh.’ ”252 In the meantime, while commentators debate the need and justification for intervention, human suffering accumulates. A norm that clearly forbids the exploitation of vulnerability, any vulnerability, is long overdue.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
This Article has focused on two questions: (1) why do victims of
“reverse redlining” so often fail in courts and (2) is there an alternative way to comprehend their problem to allow recovery? The Article
has answered the first question by identifying and portraying the
identity trap faced by borrowers who argue for discrimination in an
anti-classification age in which lower courts follow the Supreme
Court in hesitating to base decisions on group-based arguments. In
order to deal with this jurisprudential difficulty, the second answer
“restrained state” and suggesting the opposite approach that focuses on “vulnerable
subjects” and a “responsive state”).
250. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 151 (1997)
(arguing that capital markets will not prevent discrimination without regulation); see
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (explaining the “nudging” approach and its advantages as
a moderate form of intervention).
251. Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism,
122 YALE L. J. 1826, 1832 (2013).
252. MELVIN EISENBERG, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (forthcoming 2015).
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should be tailored around an individual right to dignity that includes
the right not to be subject to economic exploitation. This new framework requires an effort to better understand the impact that residency in distressed neighborhoods has on the contractual process and the
quality of consent to predatory loan agreements. Drawing on studies
of distressed neighborhoods and individual stress, I suggest here that
many lenders took advantage of borrowers’ evident vulnerability and
steered them into signing agreements detrimental to them.
The law of contracts directly applies to these agreements, and
therefore the normative recommendation made here is to use its existing doctrine of unconscionability to respond to such exploitation.
This new framework for judicial response has many advantages, the
most significant of which is the freedom it allows courts to correct
some injustices that stem from inequalities without relying on racial
or other group-based categories and without concerns regarding their
own limitation under the Equal Protection Clause.
More broadly the Article raises, via the close examination of
predatory loans, the question of the legal limits of hyper-capitalism.
It seems that one of the important lessons to be learned from the
tragic subprime crisis is how urgent it is to engage in a conversation
about the appropriate legal response to market exploitation of vulnerable individuals. Thus, the contractual framework suggested
here is also useful for the handling of other so-called “ghetto loans,”
such as: pay-day loans, auto-title loans, and other “abusive smalldollar products.”253 Further, this proposed framework will prove
valuable both beyond the lending context and outside the context of
distressed neighborhoods, and therefore can be used to cope with
other greed-motivated attempts to take advantage of a variety of
vulnerabilities.
Used along the contextual lines marked in this Article, the doctrine of unconscionability can then become instrumental in defining
and declaring the immoral nature of any form of market exploitation, regardless of regulatory loopholes. 254 Moreover, given the expressive power of law, setting a norm that would void profits earned
by exploitation and publicly condemn such behavior by labeling it
“unconscionable” can also discourage (at least some) future opportunistic attempts. Given the ongoing growth of socioeconomic ine253. Plunkett & Hurtado, supra note 227, at 55; see also Jim Hawkins, Credit on
Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto Title Lending, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 604
(2012) (“[S]tates should enact laws specifically directed at title lending that preserve the
equity borrowers have in their vehicles.”).
254. As mentioned before, this is a significant advantage of using broad standard as
opposed to concrete regulations that only ban specifically defined behaviors and by that
incentivizes a never ending search for loopholes.
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quality in our society,255 establishing an anti-exploitation norm in
the market seems more important than ever.

255. Larry Elliot & Ed Pilkington, New Oxfam report says half of global wealth held by
the 1%, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2015, 4:31 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/jan/19/global wealth oxfam inequality davos economic summit switzerland.

